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
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Cypher/OFP.

PROM GENEVA (U.K. DEUSGATION)

TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

D. 7.00 p.m. Sad September, 1947; R. 7.05 p.m. Sad September, 1947; 2nd September. 1947.

Searet

Following from MacGillivrey.

Your telegram No. 1577.

Two copies of a sketch plan showing partition scheme boundaries were enclosed with my letter to hartin of yesterday. I regret these did not show boundaries on the 1: 250,000 village index these boundaries on the 1: 250,000 village index to the report. I will send a copy of this by to-morrow to the report. I will send a copy of this by to-morrow bag which will also contain: (A) A sketch of the minority recommendation boundaries and (B) Three more copies of the report.

The station of population given in my talegram No. 1487 was preliminary calculated in englosure to Mobile His Timel washings are contained in englosure to Mobile to Mortin of verteroy. His revised to tale appear of page 188 of the report. Springly in the page of the page 188 of the report. The figures are based on because 1848 village statisties. With which Mobile was provided before to leave the factors.

out for the rederal scheme. This will be done tomorrow.

[Copy sent to Middle Bast Secretariat]

61878

1947

PALESTINE

E 18165

28165/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Delegation Geneva

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Received in Registry

Last Paper.

E8138

References.

(Print.)

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Third to co

U. N. S. C. O. P. Report lessage for transmission to the Officer Administering the Govt, of Palestine from McGillivray to be repeated by the C.O. Discusses the printing and publishing of th report.

(Minutes.)

News Dys. Jak

H13.4/9

9n-P.P. 1-tins tel 1682 4/9 Anangments have been made, & agrument with the C.O., for the Stationery Oppin 15 print 3000 copies pu Palestine.

(Action complete).)

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Next Paper.

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32003 F.O.P.

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1

Cypher/OTP

FROM UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION GENEVA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No.1480

D. 9.00 p.m. 3rd September, 1947

3rd September, 1947 R. 9.20 p.m. 3rd September, 1947

IMAEDIATE

SECRET

Following for transmission to Officer administering the Government of Palestine from MacGillivray to be repeated to Colonial Office.

My telegram No.1461.

Robles informs me that Secretary-General has no objection to report being printed and put on sale and issued to the press by the Palestine Government provided it is indicated on the cover that it is printed by the Palestine Government with the authority of the United Nations organisation. Robles requests that if Arabic and Hebrew versions are printed it should be indicated that the translations are made by the Palestine Government from the authoritative English text.

2. The report will be issued to the press at Lake Success tomorrow Thursday evening and in Geneva on Friday morning. It is realised that it will probably be impossible to print in time for simultaneous release in Jerusalem but Secretary-General is not willing to hold up release at Lake Success. He has no objection to release to the press in Palestine by the Palestine Government at any time after 23.00 hours G.M.T. Thursday 4th September.

[Copy sent to the Colonial Office].

RECORD OFFICE,

INWARD TELEGRAM

P.W:

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

MDEXED

Cypher (O.T.P.)

8/65/917/71

FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

p. 4th September, 1947.

19.35 hrs.

IMMULATE

No. 1682 Seeret

Addressed to S. of S. Repeated to Washington, No. 213.

Your telegram No. 2022 (not to Washington).

U.N.S.C.O.P. Report.

(repeat not) considered practicable. Crateful, therefore, if 500 printed copies may be sent by air as soon as possible either from London or Lake Success to be followed by 2,500 copies by first surface mail. This followed by 2,500 copies by first surface mail. This will emable full official and (? Jewish) distribution in Palestine. If United Nations prefer sale to public to be arranged through Palestine Government, number of copies to be sent by surface should be increased to copies to be sent by surface should be increased to copies to be sent by surface should be increased to copies to be sent by surface should be increased to

61878

142 1947 Registry | E8172/951/31 TELEGRAM FROM Mr Roberts ' Moscow No. 1983 Dated Received in Registry Last Paper. References. (Print.) (How disposed of.)

PALESTINE

Recommendations of U.N.S.C.O.PP
Repeated to U.K.Del. New York no 55, Cairo no 43
and Jerusqlem. All papers of Sept. 2nd publish a
one-column repartass message from New York summarising
the recommendations of U.N.S.C.O.P.

(Minutes.)

H-13. 4/9

 $(Action completed_{j})$ N'ext Paper.

8175,

32008 F.O.P.

DEPARTMINAL No. 2

En Clair

FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Roberts

No. 1983

No. 1983

R. 11.25 a.m. 4th September, 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 55,

Cairo No. 45,

Jerusalem Unnumbered

uuuuu

United Nations plan for Palestine.

All papers September 2nd publish a one-column Tass message from New York summarising the recommendations of the United Nations Palestine Committee.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York and Jerusalem as my telegrams Nos. 55 and unmumbered respectively.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York and copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

371/61878

OFFICE,

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1947	E.	E 8189
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DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to United Nations)

No. 2446

D. 11.18 p.m. 4th September 1947

R. 4.50 p.m. 4th September 1947

4th September 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem

E 8189

Washington (Saving)

000000

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 2857 and Department's letter E6901.

Palestine documents.

Your paragraph 2. This correction unfortunately arrived too late as publication had already been reprinted (and copies sent to all permanent delegations here). B.I.S. have sufficient copies and it will not (repeat not) be necessary to ask for more from Jerusalem.

- 2. Incidentally B.I.S. are puzzled by amendment in your telegram under reference as they were not aware that Palmach was the object of distinct operations. They will however take up this point direct with London.
 - 3. Your paragraph 3 noted.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusahan as my telegram No. 64.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem]

11111111 Televice TO 371 61878

OFFICE,

N. C.

PALESTIME

E 8202

UNSCOP. Recommendations.

Pregi people Alvergly residence unresp recommendations as watation of arab thistorical Rights etc.

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
32003 F.O.P.

CWF34 QUS138 S BAGHDAD 301 4 1530 = SUBJECT TO CORRECTION NR OF WORDS CK 100 SECRETARY OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS LONDON THE IRAQI PEOPLE STRONGLY CONDEMN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITEDNATIONS COMMISSION ON PALESTINE STOP TO DESTROY A PEACEFUL PEOPLE IN THEIR FATHERLAND WHERE THEY HAVE LIVED FOR SIXTEEN HUNDRED YEARS AND IMPOSE UPON THEM ALIEN PEOPLES IS NOTHING BUT A FLAGRANT INJUSTICE AND WICKED AGGRESSION STOP IN THEIR UNJUST RECOMMEN-DATIONS AND IN GRANTING A STATE TO THE JEWS OUT OF THE FATHERLAND OF THE ARABS THEREBY IGNORING THE HISTORICAL RIGHTS OF THE ORIGINAL INHABITANTS OF PALESTINE THE COMMISSION HAS ALLOWED A FLAGRANT INJUSTICE UNPARALLED IN HISTORY WHICH CONSTITUTES A CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE RIGHTS OF THE ARAB NATION TOTALLY CONTRAVENEING THE PRINCIPALES OF X FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ABOUT WHICH THE ALLIES SAID MUCH AFTER THEIR VICTORY STOP THE USURPATION OF LANDS IN PALESTINE BY FORCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE CANNOT BE REGARDED EXCEPT AS A DIRECT THREAT TO ALL THE ARABS AND A DEFINITE AGGRESSION AGAINST THEN AND THIS WILL NO DOUBT LEAD TO BLOODY AND VIOLENT CONVULSIONS IN WESTERN IN WHICH ALL THE ARABS WILL TAKE PART FOR DEFENDING THZIR DEFENDING THEIR RIGHTS AND HOMES STOP WHILE IN THE NAME OF THE IRAQI CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES WHICH IS THE TRUE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE IRAQI NATION WE PROTEST AGAINST AND CONDEMN THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS RECUENT RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH ARE UNJUST TO THE ARABS IT IS HOPED THAT WISDOM AND REASON IN UNO ASSEMBLY WILL PREVAIL OVER PERSONAL MOTIVES AND INTERESTS AND SPECIAL CAPRICES WHICH ARE NOT BASED ON RIGHT AND JUSTICE STOP AS SUCH WE TRUST THAT THE ASSEMBLY I N ORDER TO PROVE HOLDEN ITS DEVOTION TO JUSTICE AND IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD ITS REPUTATION WILL REJECT THESE UNJUST RECOMMENDATIONS AND SEE THAT ELEMENTARY ; RIGHTS OF THE ARABS IN THEIR OWN LAND ARE UPHELD UZZULDIN ALNA IS VIGE PRESIDENT OF THE IRAQI CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES +++ SENT 2316/04/PHC +

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
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
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
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SENT OUT

 $\mathbf{16173}$

CW SUS 138 S BAGHDAD 29 4 1530 =

MR ATTLEE LONDON =

THE IRAQI PEOPLE STRONGLY CONDEMN THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE UNITEDNATIONS COMMISSION ON PAKESTINE STOP
TO DESTROY A PEACEFUL PEOPLE IN THEIR FATHERLAND
WHERE THEY HAVE LIVED FOR SIXTEEN HUNDRED YEARS
AND IMPOSE UPON THEM ALIEN. PEOPLES IS NOTHING BUT A FLAGRANT INJUSTICE AND WICKED AGGRESSION

Enquiry respecting this Telegram should be accompanied by this form. Mark Your Reply VIA IMPERIAL.

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22 Tendenhall Street, E.C.3	1005 Liverpool 2: 4, Castle Street
Cereal House, 58, Mark Lane, E.C.3	Manchester 2: 94, Mosley Street
24. Royal Exchange, E.O. Salfalfields Market, E. l BIShopsgate	193 Newcastle 22321
Candlandek House, 116/126, Cannon Street, E.C.	ist Newcastle: 51, Mosley Street
Canel Court, Throgmorton Street, E.C.2	Porthcurno, Penzance (Cornwall)
21, West Smithheld, E.C.1 HOP 08	818 Sheffield 3: 50, The Wicker
	Southampton: South Western Chambers, 1, Canute Southampton 3236
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Grosvenor House, Enquiry Bureau, Fark Lane, W. WOlinelow 7	711
London Airport (Heathrow) And at the offices of THEATRE TICKETS AND MESSENGERS LIMITE	D Imperial House, 9, Donegall Square East, Belfast Belfast 27438
and at the omces of the ATRE TICKETS AND	
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BY

CW

STOP IN THEIR UNJUST RECOMMENDATIONS AND IN GRANTING A STATE TO THE JEWS OUT OF THE FATHERLAND OF THE ARABS THEREBY IGNORING THE HISTORICAL RIGHTS OF THE ORIGINAL INHABITANTS OF PALESTINE THE COMMISSION HAS ALLOWED A FLAGRANT INJUSTICE UNPARALLELED IN HISTORY WHICH CONSTITUTES A CONSPIRACY AGAINST. THE RIGHTS OF THE ARAB NATION TOTALLY CONTRAVENEING THE PRINCIPALES OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ABOUT

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NO.

SENT OUT

CW WHICH THE ALLIES SAID MUCH AFTER THEIR VICTORY STOP THE USURPATION OF LANDS IN PALESTINE BY FORCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE CANNOT BE REGARDED EXCEPT AS A DIRECT THREAT TO ALL THE ARABS AND A DEFINITE AGGRESSION AGAINST THEN AND THIS WILL NO DOUBT LEAD TO BLOODY AND VIOLENT CONVULSIONS IN WHICH ALL THE ARABS WILL TAKE PART FOR DEFENDING THEIR RIGHTS AND HOMES STOP WHILE IN

Enquiry respecting this Telegram should be accompanied by this form. Mark Your Reply VIA IMPERIAL.

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24 5/- 158 5/- 156

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PAGE4/SUS138

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NO.

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RY

WHICH IS THE TRUE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE IRAQI
NATION WE PROTEST AGAINST AND CONDEMN THE ACTION
OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH ARE
UNJUST TO THE ARABS IT ISHOPED THAT WISDOM AND
REASON IN UNO ASSEMBLY WILL PREVAIL OVER PERSONAL
MOTIVES AND INTERESTS AND SPECIAL CAPRICES WHICH ARE
NOT BASED ON RIGHT AND JUSTICE STOP AS SUCH WE TRUST


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PAGE5/SUS138



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NO.

SENT OUT

RY

THAT THE ASSEMBLY IN ORDER TO PROVE ITS

DEVOTION TO JUSTICE AND IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD ITS

REPUTATION WILL REJECT THESE UNJUST RECOMMENDATIONS

AND SEE THAT THE ELEMENTARY RIGHTS OF THE ARABS

IN THEIR OWN LAND ARE UPHELD UZZULDIN ALNA IS VICE

PRESIDENT OF THE IRAQI CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES +

Enquiry respecting this Telegram should be accompanied by this form, Mark Your Reply VIA IMPERIAL.

Reference: FO 271 K1



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10, DOWNING STREET, S.W.1

PRIVATE SECRETARY

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- 1. No acknowledgment has been sent from here.
- 2. A plain acknowledgment has been sent from here, adding that the communication has been forwarded to your Department.
- 3. A copy of the acknowledgment which has been sent from here is attached.

Mohund

Date 6/9/47.

Reference:

Dear bleancery, The Sunday of Stall has received two til yours, from the Vin - President of the Trage Smale and from the View . Browiland 9 th than he of Deputies, condemning The recommendations of the United Nations special formitter on Palestine. The Prime Minister also has present identical Elypans. from Il View Presidat 4 th Shamban. Please send any achnocledgment you think desirable.

Eastern Depo. H-13, 13/4

No. E 8202 | 951 | 31

Draft. Lan B

Bagdad

Chancery,

Top Secret.

Confidential.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

17th September, 1947.

(E 8202/951/31)

Dear Chancery,

The Secretary of State has received two telegrams, from the Vice-President of the Iraqi Senate and from the Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, condemning the recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. The Prime Minister also has received identical telegrams.

Please send any acknowledgement you think desirable.

Yours ever,

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

The Chancery, British Embassy, Bagdad. COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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The allegiance of the fifth member of this body is not explicitly stated. But it is clearly intended that he should h an Arab, so that in the last resort the will of the Arat community would preail fringestria in whing unglick bleam thomas the faction in issues on which the division of pinion followed national lines. This means that, if 9 have " / conselly

consily interpreted the minority plan, guith then would be no jimmigration without Anot consent often the period of hampilion.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61878

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PALESTINE

Report of the United Nations Special Committee.

The recommendations made by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine fall into three parts. There are twelve recommendations of principle, eleven of which were signed unanimously by eleven members and the twelfth by nine of them. These are followed by a plan for the partition of Palestine signed by seven members of the Committee. Three members put forward an alternative proposal for the establishment of a Federal State. The eleventh member, the Australian, has not associated himself with either of these plans.

The General Recommendations.

- 2 The most important of the twelve general recommendations are the first and second, to the effect that the Mandate for Palestine should be terminated and independence granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date.
- 3. The sixth general principle is also noteworthy. This recommends that the General Assembly should immediately initiate an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews would be dealt with as a matter of urgency "for the aleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem". With this is connected the twelfth general recommendation, signed by nine members, stating that "any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general".

The Majority Plan - Partition.

4. Seven members have signed a recommendation for partition on the lines of the map attached to this paper at flag A.

Noteworthy/

Noteworthy features of this plan are:

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- H. M. Government are to be responsible for carrying it out. (There is provision for the assistance of H. M. Government by one or more members of the United Nations, but the members in question are not specified) period of transition for which H.M. Government would be responsible is two years, though it is clearly implied that an extension might be necessary.
- During this period of transition, 150,000 Jewish immigrants are to be admitted. Should the period be prolonged, Jewish immigration would be allowed at the rate of 60,000 a year.
- (iii) The frontiers drawn by the authors of this plan are more favourable to the Jews and more unfavourable to the Arabs than those drawn in any partition plan which has at any time been contemplated by H. M. Government. The present population in the area designated for the Jewish State consists of approximately 500,000 Jews and 500,000 non Jews, mainly Arab.
- The independence of the two states would not be (iv) recognised by the United Nations until they had Encluded a treaty of economic union. however provided that, if only one state fulfiles the various conditions of independence, including readiness to sign the economic treaty, "the General Assembly of the United Nations shall take such action as it may deem appropriate".
- The City of Jerusalem, with a small area around (v)it, is to be placed under the direct administration of the Trusteeship Council. It would be included in the economic union of Palestine.

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If this plan were put into effect, the first task of the authority in charge of its execution would be to delimit the frontiers between the two states by means of a boundary commission. There could be little doubt that this action alone would be sufficient to precipitate an Arab rebellion in the area allocated to the Jewish State, designed to prevent the establishment of that State. In the area allocated to the Arab State, there would probably be a similar rising accompanied by absolute refusal to participate in the elections and the proposed Constituent Assembly. The vehemence and solidarity of the Arab reaction would be increased by the arrival of Jewish immigrants at the high rate of 150,000 in two years.

impossible to set up the Arab State. If sufficient force were applied to establish the Jewish State, a situation would then be created in which one State was ready to fulfill the conditions for the recommendation of its independence while the other was not. In all probability the Jews would then go to the General Assembly with the proposal that, since there was one State established in Palestine and no prospect of establishing the other, the Government of the former should be allowed to extend its authority over the territory originally allocated to the latter.

The Minority Plan - Federation.

A minority of three members advocate a Federal State, with preponderant power in the hands of the Federal Government. The boundaries of the Arab and Jewish States (which would in fact/

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61878

in fact be little more than provinces) are shown on the map at flag B.

8. The following are salient features of this plan:

- (i) There would be a three year period of transition, in which the country would be administered by "an authority to be decided by the General Assembly".
- (ii) During the period of transition immigration would be permitted into the Jewish area at a rate not exceeding its absorbtive capacity. This rate would be determined not by the administering authority but by a commission composed of three Arab and three Jewish representatives together with three nominees of the United Nations.
- (iii) The single constitutional Assembly which is envisaged under this plan would have to work within the limits laid down in a series of general provisions, of which the most important are the following:
 - (a) Immigration would be controlled by the central government.
 - (b) The right of residence would be accorded by the local governments.
 - (c) The central institutions would include a bicameral legislature. One of the two chambers would be elected in such a way as to give proportional representation to the population as a whole;

in/

in the other there would be parity
of numbers between the Jewish and
Arab representatives. Legislation
would require the approval of a
majority in both chambers.

- from this legislative system, the issue would be submitted to an arbitral body of five members, "including not less than two Arabs and two Jews". The identity of the fifth member of this body, who would in fact be the final legislative authority in many matters of major importance, is left entirely undefined. He might be an Arab or Jew or neither.
- (iv) The Head of State, who would be elected by a majority vote of both legislative chambers, would have a deputy who must be a member of the community other than his own an Arab if he were a Jew and a Jew if he were an Arab.
- State. For purposes of local government the City would fall within the Arab State.

 There would however be an international permanent commission for the supervision and protection of the Holy places.

 \mathcal{G} , under this plan also a boundary commission would be required. Its work however would not have the same importance

as under the majority plan, and the first major measure in the period of transition would be the attempt to organise the election of a constituent assembly. These elections might be boycotted by both the Arabs and the Jews. Arms settlement of this kind would in any case be unacceptable to the Jews, and the attempt to implement it would almost certainly be made by an intensification of Jewish terrorism. It is probable that the Mufti would also seize upon this pretext for releasing the rebellion which he has long been preparing, but it is likely that he would receive appreciably less support in the country for resistance to this plan than for resistance to the Majority Plan.

The Attitude to be adopted by H. M. Government.

been received in London. It is not likely however that a general judgment of the Committee's recommendations based upon the authorised summary will be seriously upset by anything in the complete text. The following considerations relate to the attitude to be adopted towards the report by H.M. Government:

Assembly on the first egy of the General
Assembly on the 9th of May, Sir Alexander
Cadogan said that if the United Nations
"can find a just solution which will be
accepted by both parties, it could hardly be
expected that we should not welcome such a
solution. All we say is that we should not
have the sole responsibility for enforcing a
solution which is not accepted by both parties
and which we cannot reconcile with our own
conscience".

32

- the twelve general recommendations, which eleven of have been adopted unanimously by the Committee, appear to be acceptable. In particular we have good reason to welcome no. 6., urging that the problem of displaced European Jews should be dealt with internationally.
- (iii) The majority proposal is so manifestly unjust to the Arabs that it is difficult to see how, in Sir A. Cadogan's words, "we could reconcile it with our conscience". There are also strong reasons of expediency for declining the responsibility for giving effect to this proposal.
 - (a) The attempt to do so would precipitate disorder on a very large scale in Palestine.
 - (b) If we are to leave Palestine in the near future, it is important that we should do so in a manner calculated not to damage our relations with the independent Arab States, the importance of which is a long-term interest of far greater importance than any advantage we might derive from remaining in Palestine for two If before leaving years longer. the country we were to undertake the task of partitioning it in accordance with the majority proposals, we should thereby incur the risk of so estranging the Arab countries that our whole position

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Reference: TO 371 61878

in the Middle East would be jeopardised.

- (c) It is improbable that British

 public opinion would support a

 policy which involved crushing

 a large-scale Arab rising in the

 interest of the Jews.
- (iv) The minority proposal would provide for a just and reasonable settlement in Palestine if it proved to be practicable. Much of its detail appears to have been inspired by the two series of proposals which H. M. Government placed before the Palestine Conference last winter. in presenting to the Arabs and Jews first the plan for provincial autonomy and subsequently the "Bevin Plan", H. M. Government explained that each was to be regarded as a basis for negotiation only. It was in fact assumed at that time that the plans would not be practicable unless they secured some measure of consent in Palestine.
- (v) It is not certain that, if the Assembly were to adopt the minority proposal, they would ask H.M. Government to give effect to it. Under this plan the choice of the administering authority during the period of transition is left to the Assembly itself. It must however be expected that, if the Assembly wished this plan to be carried out, they would turn in the first

instance/

instance to H.M. Government as their instrument.

(vi) If H.M. Government find themselves unable to accept responsibility for carrying out whatever recommendation is made by the General Assembly, the only alternative course will probably be to declare their intention of leaving the country on a given date within the next two or three years.

- (vii) In the light of the above considerations, it is suggested that some declaration of the British attitude should be made at a fairly early stage in the proceedings of the Assembly, and that it should include the following points:
 - (a) Acceptance of the twelve/recommendations made by the Committee. To this might be added a statement that H.M. Government welcome in particular the sixth of these recommendations and urge the Assembly to act upon it.
 - not be willing to accept the task of giving effect to any policy which did not offer a reasonable prospect of acquiescence by a substantial part of the population of Palestine.
 - (c) Warning that the plan recommended by
 the majority of the Committee did not
 fulfil this condition and that if the
 Assembly adopted it they could not count
 upon H.M. Government to carry it out.
 (It would not be necessary at this stage
 to comment on the minority plan since
 this proposal, unlike that of the
 majority/

majority, does not include a recommendation that H.M. Government should be the authority invited to carry it out).

// It is for consideration whether this initial statement of the position of H.M. Government should also include a declaration of their intentions to withdraw from Palestine at the earliest possible date, and of their readiness, should the Assembly recommend a policy which they were unwilling to operate, to hand over the administration of Palestine to an authority designated by the United Nations to succeed them for this purpose.

This paper represents the Departments preliminary views on the Cherial Committee's report. There are several points which will, of course, require further careful consideration, as in the only alternative course (if NAM Just: find obtained would made to carry out the accumbly's reparamendations) would be to declar their intention of leaving the country by a point date. The citation in Paterties is, of course, very different to that in chalin is the implications of a refusal to carry out the accumbly incommendations, if the accumbly should succeed in producing another. Power or group of Powers (possibly including Soviet Russia) to carry them out.

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United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

Summary of Recommendations.

"The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine today signed at Geneva, at 10.30 p.m. Greenwich mean time, and sent to the Secretary-General for transmission to the General .. ssembly its report and recommendations on the question of Palestine.

npart from specific plans as to the constitution of the future Government and territorial provisions, matters on which a majority and a minority proposal are submitted, the committee forwards to the General Assembly the following eleven unanimous recommendations:

- 1. the mandate for Palestine shall be terminated at the earliest practicable date.
- 2. Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date.
- 3. There shall be a transitional period preceding the granting of independence which shall be as short as possible, consistent with the achievement of the conditions essential to independence.
- 4. During the transitional period the authority entrusted with administering Palestine and preparing it for independence shall be responsible to the United Nations.
 - 5. With regard to religious interests and the holy places,
- (A) in whatever solution may be adopted, the sacred character of the holy places shall be preserved and access to the holy places shall be ensured in accordance with existing rights.
- (B) The present rights of the several religious communities shall not be impaired or denied.
- (C) An adequate system for the impartial settlement of religious disputes shall be devised.
- (D) Specific stipulations regarding these matters shall be inserted in the constitution or constitutions of any independent Palestinian State or States which may be created.
- 6. The General Assembly should undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews, of whom approximately 250,000 are in assembly centres, will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem.
- 7. It shall be a prior condition to the granting of . independence that the political structure of the new State or States, including its constitution or other fundamental law, shall be basically democratic, i.e. representative in character. The constitution shall contain guarantees of essential human rights and fundamental freedoms, and safeguards to protect the rights and interests of minorities. /8.

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- 8. A prior condition to independence shall also be the incorporation in the constitution of basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
- 9. It shall be accepted as a cardinal principle that the preservation of the economic unity of Palestine is indispensable to the life and development of the country and its peoples.
- 10. States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners including consular jurisdiction by capitulation or usage in the ottoman empire, should be invited by the United Nations to renounce any rights pertaining to them in the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in an independent Palestine.
- 11. The General Assembly shall call on the peoples of Palestine to extend their fullest co-operation to the United Nations in its effort to devise and put into effect an equitable and workable means of settling the difficult situation prevailing there, and to this end, in the interest of peace, good order, and lawfulness, to exert every effort to bring to an early end the acts of violence which have for too long beset that country.
- 12. The Committee agreed with two dissenting votes to a twelfth recommendation as follows:

In the appraisal of the Palestine question it should be accepted as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general.

Scheme of partition with economic union.

According to the plan of the majority (the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay), Palestine shall be constituted into an Arab State, a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem. The Arab and the Jewish States will become independent after a transitional period of two years beginning on 1st September, 1947. Before, however, their independence can be recognised, they must adopt a constitution, make to the United Nations a declaration containing certain guarantees, and sign a treaty by which a system of economic collaboration is established and the economic union of Palestine is created. A summary of its essential features follows:-

I. Transitional period and Constitution.

A. During the transitional period, the United Kingdom shall carry on the administration of Palestine under the auspices of the United Nations and on such conditions and under such supervision as the United Kingdom and the United Nations may agree upon. If so desired, the administration will be carried on with the assistance of one or more members of the United Nations.

2

The United Kingdom shall during the transitional period take such preparatory steps as may be necessary for the execution of the scheme recommended and shall carry out the following measures:-

- (1) dmit into the proposed Jewish state 150,000 Jewish immigrants at a uniform monthly rate, 30,000 of whom on humanitarian grounds. Should the transitional period continue for more than two years, Jewish immigration shall be allowed at the rate of 60,000 per year. The Jewish Agency shall be responsible for the solection and care of the Jewish immigrants and for the organising of Jewish immigration during the transitional period.
- (2) The restrictions introduced under the authority of the Palestine (amendment) Order-in-Council of 25th May, 1939, will not apply to the transfer of land within the borders of the proposed Jewish state.

B. Constituent Assemblies shall be elected by the populations of the areas which are to comprise the Arab and Jewish states, respectively.

Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over 20 years of age who are


(a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State

and

- (b) rabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State. Arabs and Jews residing in the city of Jerusalem, who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively. Women may vote and be elected to the constituent assemblies.
- C. The Constituent Assemblies shall draw up the constitutions of the states. The Constitutions shall provide for the establishment in each state of a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation and an executive body responsible to the Legislature. They shall also contain provisions for the protection of the holy places, religious buildings and sites, and for the religious and minority rights. Equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be guaranteed. Freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the two states in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem shall be preserved.
- provisional government empowered to make the declaration and sign the treaty of economic union. On making the declaration and signing the treaty of economic union by either state, its independence as a sovereign state shall be recognised. If only one state fulfils these conditions the General Assembly of the United Nations shall take such action as it may deem proper.

/pending

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Pending such action the régime of economic union shall apply.

II. Declaration.

The declaration shall contain provision for the protection of the holy places and religious buildings and sites and the religious and minority rights. There shall be no discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or language. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab or Jewish minorities in their own language and in their cultural traditions, and each community shall have the right to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own Palestinian citizens, as well as Arabs and Jews who, although not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident. Such persons if over 18 years of age, may opt within one year for the citizenship of the other State or declare that they retain the citizenship of any State of which they are citizens; provided that no person who has signed the notice of intention referred to in paragraph B above about the constituent assemblies shall have the right of option. A resident of the City of Jerusalem, who signs a notice of intention, may opt for citizenship of one of the Palestinian States, if an Arab of the Arab State and if a Jew of the Jewish State.

III. Economic Union.

A treaty shall be entered into between the two States, which shall contain certain provisions to establish the economic union of palestine and to provide for other matters of common interest.

The objectives of the economic union of Palestine shall be a customs union, common currency, operation in the common interest. of railways, inter-state highways, postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and the Ports of Haifa and Jaffa. It shall also promote joint economic development especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation. A joint economic board shall be established to consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The functions of the joint economic board shall be to organise and administer the objectives of the economic union. After various obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the city of Jerusalem and the residue in equal proportion to the arab and Jewish States.

IV. The City of Jerusalem.

The city of Jerusalem shall be placed, after the transitional period, under the international trusteeship system by means of a trusteeship agreement which shall designate the United Nations as the administering authority. The city of Jerusalem shall include within its borders the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which to be Abu Dis, the most southern Bethlehem, the most western Ein Karim and the most northern

/Shu'fat.

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The city of Jerusalem shall be demilitarised. Governor of the city of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. He will be neither Shu'fat. Arab nor Jew nor a citizen of the Palestine States nor, at the time of his appointment, a resident of the city of Jerusalem. The Governor shall be empowered to make decisions on the basis of the existing rights (status quo) in cases of disputes which may arise between the different communities in respect of the Holy places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine. The protection of the holy places, religious buildings and sites in the city of Jerusalem shall be entrusted to a special police force the members of which shall be recruited outside Palestine and shall be neither Arab nor Jew. of Jerusalem shall be included in the economic union of Palestine.

V. Boundaries of the Trab and Jewish States.

The proposed Arab State will include Western Galilee, the hill country of Samaria and Judea with the exclusion of the City of Jerusalem, and the coastal plain from Isdud to the The proposed Jewish State will include Eastern Galilee, the plain of Esdraelon, most of the coastal plain, and the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, which includes the The three sections of the Trab State and the three sections of the Jewish State are linked together by two points of intersection, of which one is situated south-east of Afula in the sub-district of Nazareth and the other north-east of El Majdal in the sub-district of Gaza.

The ..rab State -

Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and in the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras En Naqura to Qadas; on the east the boundary, starting from Qadas, passes southwards, west of Safad to the south-western corner of the Safad sub-district; thence it follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point just east of Mount Tabor, thence southwards to the point of intersection south-Western Galilee takes a line from this point passing south of Nazareth and Shafr Amr, but north of Beit Lahm to the coast just south of Acre.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starting on the Jordan River south-east of Beisan follows the northern boundary of the Samaria district westwards to the point of intersection south-east of Afula, thence again westwards to Lajjun, thence in a south-westerly direction, passing just west of Tulkarm, east of Qalqiliya, west of Majdal Yaba, thence bulging westwards towards Rishon Le Zion so as to include Lydda and Ramle in the Arab State, thence turning again eastwards to a point west of Latrun, thereafter following the northern side of the Latrun-Majdal road to the second point of inter-section, thence south-eastwards to a point on the Hebron sub-district boundary south of Qubeiba, thence following the southern boundary of the Hebron sub-district boundary to the Dead Sea.

The Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point a few miles north of Isdud to the Egyptian frontier extending inland approximately eight kilometres.

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The Jewish State -

The north-eastern sector of the proposed Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) will have frontiers with the Lebanon in the North and west and with Syria and Transjordan on the east and will include the whole of the Huleh Basin, Lake Tiberias and the whole of the Beisan sub-district.

The Jewish sector on the coastal plain extends from a point south of here to just north of Isdud in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa, Tel-Aviv and Jaffa.

The Beersheba area includes the whole of the Beersheba subdistrict and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district.

From Beisan the Jewish State will extend northwest following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Jewish sector on the coastal plain extends from a point south of Acre to just north of Isdud in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa, Tel-Aviv and Jaffa.

The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area includes the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, which includes the Negeb, and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district south of the point of inter-section. The northern boundary of this area, from the point of intersection, runs south-eastwards to a point on the Hebron sub-district boundary south of Qubeiba, and thence follows the southern boundary of the Hebron sub-district to the Dead Sea.

Scheme for a Federal State.

Three members (the representatives of India, Persia and Yugoslavia) propose an independent Federal State. The major provisions of that plan are briefly summarised as follows:-

I. Constitution and transitional period.

An independent Federal State of Palestine shall be created following a transitional period not exceeding three years, during which responsibility for administering Palestine and preparing it for independence shall be entrusted to an authority to be decided by the General Assembly.

The independent Federal State shall comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State, Jerusalem shall be its capital. During the transitional period a constituent Assembly shall be elected by popular vote and convened by the administering authority on the basis of electoral provisions which shall ensure the fullest representation of the population, provided that the electorate includes all adult persons who have acquired palestinian citizenship as well as all Arabs and Jews who, though non-citizens, are resident in Palestine and have applied for citizenship not less than three months before the date of election. The constituent assembly shall draw up the constitution of the Federal State. Independence shall be declared by the General Assembly once a Constitution incorporating the following provisions has been adopted by the Constituent Assembly:

Reference: FO 371/6187

- A) The Federal State shall comprise a Federal Government and Governments of the Arab and Jewish States, respectively.
- B) Full authority shall be vested in the Federal Government with regard to National Defence, Foreign Relations, Immigration, Currency, Taxation for Federal purposes, Foreign and Inter-State Waterways, Transport and Communications, copyrights and Patents.
- C) The Arab and Jewish States shall enjoy full powers of local self-Government and shall have authority over education, taxation for local purposes, the right of residence, commercial licences, land permits, grazing rights, inter-state migration, settlement, police, punishment of crime, social institutions and services, public housing, public health, local roads, agriculture and local industries.
- D) The organs of Government shall include a head of State, an executive body, a representative flederal legislative body composed of two chambers, and a federal court. The executive shall be responsible to the legislative body.
- E) The head of State shall be elected by a majority vote of both chambers of the federal legislative body. A deputy head of State shall be elected who shall be a representative of the community other than that with which the head of State is identified.
- F) Election to one chamber of the federal legislative body shall be on the basis of proportional representation of the population as a whole, and to the other on the basis of equal representation of the Arab and Jewish citizens of Palestine. Legislation shall be enacted when approved by majority votes in both chambers: in the event of disagreement between the two chambers, the issue shall be submitted to an arbitral body of five members including not less than two Arabs and two Jews.
- G) The Federal Court shall be the final court of appeal regarding constitutional matters. Its members, who shall include not less than four Arabs and three Jews, shall be elected by both Chambers of the federal legislative body.
 - H) The consitution shall forbid any discriminatory Federal or State legislation against population groups or against either of the States, and shall guarantee equal rights for all minorities. It shall be based on the full equality of all citizens of Palestine with regard to the political, civil and religious rights of the individual and shall guarantee fundamental human rights and freedoms. It shall guarantee inter alia free access to holy places and protect religious interests.
 - I) The constitution shall provide for undertakings to settle international disputes by peaceful means.
 - J) There shall be a single Palestinian nationality and citizenship.
 - K) The constitution shall provide for equitable participation of representatives of both communities in Delegations to international conferences.

/II•

II. Holy places.

In addition to the guarantees contained in the constitution regarding the protection of and free access to hely places, there shall be set up a permanent international body for the supervision and protection of the hely places, to be composed of three representatives designated by the United Nations and one representative of each of the recognised faiths having an interest in the matter, as may be determined by the United Nations.

III. Jewish immigration into Palestine.


For a period of three years from the beginning of the transitional period Jewish immigration shall be permitted into the Jewish State in such numbers as not to exceed its absorptive capacity, and having due regard for the rights of the existing population within that State and their anticipated natural rate of increase. An international commission, composed of three Arab, three Jewish and three United Nations representatives shall be appointed to estimate the absorptive capacity of the Jewish State. The commission shall cease to exist at the end of the three year period mentioned above.

IV. Boundaries.


The Arab area of the proposed Federal State includes most of the interior of the country, except for Eastern Galilee and a large area of the Beersheba sub-district which fall within the boundaries of the Jewish area. The Arabs are allotted the coastal plain from Jaffa South to the Egyptian frontier, and the Western portion of the Beersheba sub-district, including Beersheba town, Asluj and Auja, and a strip along the whole length of the Egyptian frontier to the Gulf of Aquba. Also within the Arab area, but not contiguous with the area just described, is western Galilee, bounded on the west by the Mediterranean from Acre to Ras en Nagura, on the north by Lebanon and including safad to the east and Nazareth to the south. The Jewish areas likewise not contiguous, but divided into two It includes the coastal plain from but excluding Acre on the north, to Tel Aviv, with a finger reaching south-east from Tel Aviv through Rishon le Zion and Rehovoth to the neighbourhood of the boundaries of the Gaza and Hebron sub-district. plain of Esdraelon forms a bridge connecting this coastal area with the valley of Jezreel, Beisan, Tiberias, and the Huleh Valley, which are likewise allotted to the Jews. area to the south includes that part of the Hebron sub-district which lies south and east of Dahariya and Yatta, and a rectangular area of the Beersheba sub-district, bounded on the east by the Wadi Araba and on the west by a line drawn to the east of Beersheba and ...sluj, and extending southward to approximately latitude 30.3 degrees.

When the two above schemes concerning partition or federal State were voted upon, one member of the Committee, the representative of Australia, abstained in both cases.

SCHEME FEDERAL BOUNDARIES LEBAN O N Ghabaghib **PALESTINE** Scale 1:750,000 SYRIA International Boundaries+ + + + + + District Boundaries Sub-District Boundaries FIRST SECOND OTHER Railways..... gwish Shalid shaded blue Zarqa Rishon le Zivon 'AMMAN o Taiyiba Ramallaho Jericho ·Qaryat el 'Inab **JÉRUSALEM** \mathbf{z} **Bet**hlehem Beit Jibrin Z Hebron Dhiban တ Dhahiriya







32008 F.O.P.

8262

2 2 3 8 6 Reference: (C. Second OFFICE, LONDON)

Reference: (C. Second OFFICE, LONDON)

371 61878

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans

No. 652

D. 4.24 p.m. 6th September, 1947

6th September, 1947

R. 7.35 p.m. 6th September, 1947

Repeated to Cairo
Damascus
Amman
Jedda
Jerusalem

888888

Palestine.

Lebanon will be represented at meeting of General Assembly of United Nations by Camille Chamoun, Abdullah Yefi, Adel Usseyran and Lebanese Ministers in London and Washington. The first-named is leaving by air for United Kingdom on September 7th.

- 2. Chamoun whom I saw today said he hoped to call at Foreign Office on his arrival in London.
- 3. Reaction here to recommendations of UNSCOP has been universally unfavourable. No statement has however been issued by devernment and little original comment has appeared in the press.

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DEPARTMENTAL NO.2
FIGE 8262

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans. No.653

D. 4.39 p.m. 6th September, 1947

6th September, 1947 R. 7.25 p.m. 6th September, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem)

Amman)

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Cairo)

Jedda)


Palestine.

Secretary General of Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed me that political Committee of Arab League would meet here on September 16th to discuss UNSCOP recommendations. He stated press reports of earlier meeting were unfounded.

SEP

Reference:-

OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,



Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 2.

FROM RIO DE JANEIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Young

D. 2.06 p.m. 5th September, 1947. No. 442 5th September, 1947. R. 9.5 p.m. 5th September, 1947.

Repeated to New York (United Kingdom Delegation)
(Foreign Office please pass)

FFFF

Heads of pro-Palestine Committees of South America took the opportunity of the Rio de Janeiro conference to assemble here and lobby South American Andelegates about Palestinian question which is shortly to be discussed by United Nations.

> [Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York]



1947	E	E 8266
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Reference:

371/61878

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Cypher CTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

PROM GENEVA TO POPELON OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation)

E 8266

No. 1512

D. 2.01 p.m. 6th September 1917

6th September 1917. R. 2.31 p.m. 6th September 1947.

THATED YAVE

PETET

Following for Colonial Office for MacGillivray from Ellis.

Palestine.

Information Contro at Palais has received official message from Lake Success to held up release until Monday 2.30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. No reason given.

2. Additional copies of report may not be ready until Honday, when they will be sent by Fereign Office bag.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office].

SE SE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

CYPHER/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

E 8297

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr Busk No: 802 D.8.58 a.m. 8th September 1947

6th September 1947 Repeated to Beirut R.11.25 a.m. 8th September 1947

Jedda Jerusalem Caire

> Amman United Kingdom Delegation New York

> > 4444

RESTRICTED

Ed Di

UNSCOP report.

Iraqi re-actions have taken a little time to develop and the peak may not yet have been reached.

- 2. Press comment has in many cases recommended the use of force to resist implementation of recommendations.
- 5. Protests have been received by this Embassy from both Iraqi Houses of Parliament pointing out that adoption of recommendations will inevitably lead to bloodshed.
- 4. About 100 telegrams of protest with a total of about 1000 signatures have been received by British and United States Embassies from all parts of Iraq.

Among the Signatories are a few of important tribal leaders and a number of jews.

- 5. Sporadic demonstrations have taken place in Hilla Ramadi Erbil and Kut. These may spread to Bagdad after meetings of political parties which are called for the next few days. Iraqi Gevernment may find it necessary to allow such demonstrations.
- 6. General re-action is anger. Pre-Zionist report was expected, but there is surprise at the lengths to which this tendency has been carried. Position of Iraqi Government is made more difficult at a critical time and Right Wing Ultra Nationalists will not miss their opportunity.

Foreign Office please pass to Amman and United King-dom Delegation New York as my telegrams Nes: 59 and 7 respectively.

[Repeated to Amman and United Kingdom Delegation New York]

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En Clair

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

6

Mr. Busk No.804

D. 6.01 a.m. 9th September, 1947

8th September, 1947 R.10.45 a.m. 9th September, 1947

Repeated to Beirut No. 100

My telegram to Amman No. 58.

Iraqi Prime Minister of Press Conference on September 6th announced postponement until September 16th of meeting of Arab States representatives to consider Unscop report. Prime Minister went on to say that he hoped a decisive line of action would result from the meeting. He could give no details but public could be sure that decisions would be firm and conclusive and would lead to a solution satisfactory to the Arabs. He called on the people to be prepared for sacrifice and on the press to mould public opinion towards this end. Sacrifice might not be required but it was necessary to be prepared. He ended by expressing himself as hopeful of a satisfactory solution.

rence: FO 371/61878

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8346

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No. 760 (1307/55/47) Winister 5 65

His Majesty's Ambassator presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copie sof the undermentioned paper.

British Embassy, Cairo.

E 832

3rd September 19

Reference to previous communication:

Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.

Subject.

EXTRACT FROM THE "EGYPTIAN MAIL" OF 2nd SEPTEMBER; 1947.

Similar Extract sent to:Jerusalem Damascus
Bagdad Amman
Beirut Jedda.

Reference: TO 271 612

(21106) Wt.8578/807 5,000 4/42 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685

Egypian Mail 2nd Seltember 1947

Plan Would Lead To Revolt, Say Arabs

THE Arab Executive Committee of Palestine, headed by the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem, warned last night that any attempt to carry out either the majority or minority proposals of UNO's Special Committee on the Holy Land would "set Palestine and the Arab East on fire."

In a statement issued following a meeting in Cairo of the Mufti and several other members, the Committee declared both the majority plan for partition of Palestine and the minority proposal for a joint Arab-Jewish state under a federal government were contradictory to Arab aspirations, to the United Nations Charter, and "all principles or right and justice."

Declaring both proposals ignored the rights of the Arab nation and the Islamic world as well as those of Palestine Arabs, the committee added:

One Known Result

"Any attempt to carry out these recommendations would have one known result — to set Palestine and the Arab East on fire and to turn the sacred country, which has been described as the birthplace of peace, into the land of disturbances and catastrophies."

The Committee said it had boycotted UNSCOP because it had suspected bad intentions on the part of the majority, but that it was nevertheless astonished at the majority recommendations "which exceed all limits of aggression by former inquiry commissions against the rights of Arabs in Palestine."

rights of Arabs in Palestine."

"The committee is completely convinced," the statement said, "that the sacred country, maintained by a determined people and watched over by seventy million Moslems, will not be affected by unjust decisions whatever the source and whatever force is applied to carry them out."

The committee demands an end of all Jewish immigration and establishment of an independent Arab Palestine. — A.P.

(Reaction to UNSCOP — see page 3)

174/

E 8346

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Received in Registry) 10 Kg.

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25/9. \$\langle \text{ We outher on . 60.} \\
Left 26.

Now see pests II and III fatherheat.

This extraordinary telegram suggests that the Palestine Administration are already packing their bags.

Paragraph 6. While assuming that we should not fight the Arabs in order to compel them to establish their own State, or in order to defend the Jewish State once it was created, they appear to recommend that we should hold down by force the Arab population of the Jewish State for six months, pending the The effect of establishemnt of a Jewish Government. such action on our relations with the Arab world generally is too obvious for comment.

Paragraph 8. This speaks of taking in secrecy all possible preparatory steps to reduce the length We might perhaps write of the period of transition. to the Colonial Office, emphasising the imperative need for secrecy in any preliminary moves which the Palestine Government may make on the assumption that partition may eventually be imposed. One measure which might be usefully carried out, and which would not indicate a tendency towards any particular form of settlement, is the acceleration of the long-awaited There has been no census in Palestine since census. 1931 and, since electoral registers will be required under any plan for the early independence of Palestine, it seems more than ever desirable that the census should take place without delay.

The telegram speaks of the "appalling events at Hamburg". This is a very surprising phrase in view of the fact that the landing of illegal immigrants at Hamburg is the consequence of a policy which the Palestine Government begged us to undertake.

Paragraph 13. The qualifying clause in the third sentence of this paragraph may not exactly convey Sir Henry Gurney's meaning. We are not necessarily looking for a policy which would make possible an immigration rate of 6,250 monthly.

(Action (Index) completed)

Next Paper

535,

H. Beeley. 11/9

68

The til is only to be explained in the light of the line state of mind which has , understandably, developed in the administration.

Mr Beeley M. Ma

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9n.P.P. Pirtine tal 1726 12/9.

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9. P. P. 1.0 6/ 2167 13/9.
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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:- FO 371 61878

INWARD TELEGRAM

Edwis-

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D.8th September, 1947.

E 8346

20.10 hrs. (1) SE

IMPORTANT

No. 1691 Top Secret and Personal.

5th September. Your top secret and personal telegram of

Following for Martin.

This telegram is in 3 parts.

Part I. Regins.

Nations Council of the Special Committee that the Mandate shall be terminated and independence granted at the earliest practicable date will presumably meet with general support, and I assume that his Majesty's Government will accept them. Such acceptance entails carrying out a decision to leave Palestine after making provision for independence in one way or another, and we have therefore to consider from our point of view here whether the partition scheme recommended by majority is a practicable way or not.

that on Committee's own figures (including 90,000 Bedouins), the Jewish State would contain actually more Arabs than Jews. The Jewish citizens would be augmented by 100,000 from Jerusalem, since all adult Jews in Jerusalem could be counted on to sign a note of intention to become citizens of the Jewish State. (Their families would have to be included in the figures of the total population on which representation is calculated: and such notice of intention would not carry with it any obligation to leave Jerusalem). This would give 600,000 Jews as against 506,000 Arabs, but these figures are being checked. The Arab population

	1 2 3 4 5	
7	Reference:	
371/61878		



is larger than in any plan yet seriously propounded. It Ts, of the in fact, so large that Arab opinion here still finds it difficult to regard the plan as a serious proposition at all. The absence of any immediate violent reaction by the Arabs can be attributed to this incredulity, and many Arabs regard it rather as a joke. It seems very possible that Arabs would have a majority population in quite a short time, if the present rate of natural increase continues and if the political stimulus given by the present circumstances to Jewish immigration fades away.

J. Majority of the Committee recognise this demerit but prefer bold solution, possibly with the hope of gaining support at least from one side and in the knowledge that concessions would have to be given to the Araba. These changes can of course be made in innumerable different ways but two outstanding possibilities relate to Jaffa and Beersheba area. I shall telegraph cur suggestions on this aspect separately. A decision on boundaries is the first essential, for until that is taken nothing else can be done. I should like to assume that for the moment (and this telegram is full of assumptions) that it will prove possible to adjust the area so as to include not more than 400,000 Araba (including Bedouins). The Constituent Assembly would thus be composed, on paper, of Jews and Araba in proportion of 6 to 4.

All the Committee says about the compesition of Constituent Assemblies is that they should be elected according to electoral provisions to be prescribed by the power administering the Territory. This would mean provision of communal rolls and communal electors; divisions, with provision that persons who are neither Jews nor Arabs could elect to be registered on either roll. One seat per 10,000 would produce an assembly of 60 Jews and 40 Arabs in the Jewish State and about 90 Arabs and 3 Jews in the Arab State. It is not to be seriously supposed that the Arabs would have anything to do with elections to the Jewish State Constituent Assembly. It is certain they would boycott them, but nevertheless this feet could not be established until provision for them had been made and opportunity given to register. At that stage, it would be necessary to decide whether, in the interests of speed, th full course of Jewish elections should be gone through in preference to using the elected assembly of the Jewish community (Assefat Hanivherim). The objections to the latter suggestion

RECORD 6187

(1) that Jewish community rules under which elections to Assefat Hanivharim (?group omitted) provide for "option (?out of)" of the Jewish community and that some thousands of persons, mostly Agudat Israel, have exercised this right and neither participated in the last elections now appear on the electoral registers;

boycotted by Revisionists, General Zionists (corrupt group) (now absorbed in the Confederation of General Zionists), the Sephardio Organisation, and three small Right Wing bodies.

Other plans have envisaged that the Jewish Agency should be recognised as provisional Government, but I feel that this would be both unnecessary and out of the question.

The High Commissioner would have wide powers to legislate by order (as Governors-General have in the Indian Independence Act) up to the appointed day on which, having made its declaration and signed proposed treaty, the (Thew) States would be recognised as independent.

It would be desirable that legislative provision for the stages leading to independence should be used by His Majesty's Government at the earliest possible moment after a decision has been (corrupt ?reached). The Attorney General is engaged on drafting the Bill; of which I hope to send you the first draft in about a week's time. This work shows up various points of difficulty that do not otherwise appear.

Part I ends.

Distributed to:R.245
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. I. Thomas
Bir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Mr. Martin
Foreign Office

Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Bennett
Mr. MacGillivray

Mr. H. Realey.

7/5

INVARD TELEGRAM

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

TO S. OF S. COLONTES.

D. 8th September, 1947. R. 8th "

20.10 hrs.

IMPORTANT Top Secret PART II.

What we have generally in mind is a procedure which would lead to the appointed day for the Jewish State occurring in some six months' time. That may well herrify you, but speed, finality and firmness are vital. I know how unlikely we are to get them, but delay will only Worsen the situation. The Jews will look to the world to see that the Committee's present plan or something very like it is carried out and will claim the right to carry it out themselves if there is hesitation. There may be many who will say "Let them try". Assuming, then, that some time next year we have an independent Jewish State, we shall certainly have chaos and uproar in the Arab area. This would be under martial law until immediate promise of independence became more attractive than continued resistance to a fait accompli. All sorts of difficulties and dangers arise here, but I need not refer to them in this telegrom.

first line on page 125 of the Report Is deliberate. The plan recommends independence not within two years but only after the Jewish State has assimilated 150,000 new immigrants. The procedure contemplated by the majority whereby the independence of the three States would be brought to fruition together two years shead seems impossible with Arab resistance. By establishing the Jewish State with all possible speed we should fulfill our "promise" to the Jews, but we should surely make it clear that in doing so we have no intention of fighting the Arabs, either in its defence or in attempting to constitute the two other States in-accordance with decisions with which the Arabs themselves disagree. If we wait two

73

years before launching the Jewish State, we shall only become more hopelessly entangled in a responsibility for internal security in that area, a responsibility which we should pass to the Jews as quickly as possible. The administering authority of the City of Jerusalem should be in a position to begin its trusteeship six months from now. This would mean drafting the Trusteeship Agreement as well as declarations for approval at the forthcoming session of the Assembly. This latter point is important for purpose of the time-table as I see it and I suggest that drafting of the Trusteeship Agreement should begin now.

- 7. The plan for Economic Board seems to us workable and sound. The non-representation of City of Jerusalem on the Board is no doubt deliberate in view of U.N.O. membership and of the fact that Jerusalem's one member would have to be either a Jew or an Arab. There is no purpose to be gained in attempting to put Income Tax administration or a Roads Department under the Board, but Civil Aviation should certainly be placed there. Incidentally, the report is silent as to Lydda Airport and boundary as drawn (x?Mohn) runs through it. It is a little curious that this important feature is not mentioned in the Report. Like the ports, it should be administered by a "common service" department under the Board. Financially it might be a fairly heavy liability.
- Three U.N.O. members of the Board Fould in fact be in a position to exercise far greater authority than a first reading of the Report suggests. The States are to bind themselves to accept the decisions of the Board. Experience suggests that the Board would frequently find itself sitting without States' members, in which event the U.N.O. members, as well as being always in the position of arbitrators, would themselves control the activities of the Economic Union. I have never been able to accept the view that in such circumstances economics are separable from politics. The operation of the ports of Haifa and Jaffa, the maintenance of the Hejaz railway, the design of postage stamps and the structure of the customs tariff are all matters that will raise political issues. The three U.N.O. members will occupy a key position in the economic and political control of Palestine (?having been) given virtually a blank cheque gueranteed by the States. This sould be borne in mind in connection with the question of what quid pro quo might be demanded for carrying out the plen. A seat on the Board would be likely to be more valuable than the trusteeship of the City of Jerusalen.

PART II ENDS.

z Correction being obtained.

/Distributed to:-

74

Distributed to:-

R. 243
Secretary of State.
Sir T. Lloyd.
Mr. Ivor Thomas.
Sir S. Caine.
Sir C. Jeffries.
Mr. Holding.
Mr. Martin.
Foreign Office

Mr. Trafford Smith.
Mr. Gutch.
Mr. Mathleson.
Mr. Higham.
Mr. Bennett.
Mr. MacGillivray.

Mr. H. Beeley.

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:-FO 371 61878

Cypher (0.TP.)

FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 8th September, 1947.

23.30 hrs.

IMPORTANT No.1691 Top Secret. Part III.

8. I do not know what is exactly meant by the majority's recommendation that conditional power, during the transititional period, shall carry on administration under the auspices of United Nations. I imagine that if Britain took on the execution of the plan at all she would do so on her own terms. Nor do I (group omitted ?know) in what form assistance in Pelestine could be given by any other member of United Nations. It is obvious that British troops and police, however fully clothed with authority of United Nations would still be to the Arabs simply British troops and police.

It may well be that the majority of the plan as it stands could never be accepted by H.M. Government but there are clear prospects that with the amendment of boundaries it might have to be accepted as a pis aller. It is therefore our duty to take in secrecy all possible preparatory steps that would reduce length of transitional period. This is being done. Meanwhile we cannot enter on any discussions in Palestine with cither Jews or Arabs. This is a great handicap as it seems to me probable that by wise handling of local discussions, greater recognition of the facts of the situation on the part of the people, who are after all directly concerned, could be obtained than would be possible after intransigeant attitudes had been publicly taken by interests claiming to represent both sides outside Palestine. The Jewish Agency have already begun to proceed to drop their campaign of vilification of Britain and this administration, and to offer a bouquet of gratitude to the mandatory in which the nettles and olive branches have been arranged with admirable discretion. Tentative approaches have already been made by the Agency suggesting that any /desired

desired facilities in the Jewish State would be readily granted by the British. Even the appalling events at Hemburg have not mitigated this sudden attack of friendliness. This situation ought to be exploited by placing responsibility for securing Arab acquiescence fairly and squarely on Jews, whose resources and propaganda machine should be and could be turned in this direction rather than against British in American press. But until we know H.M. Government's intentions we must remain resolutely silent and ineffective.

9. I saw Jamel Husseini this morning at his request. He came estensibly to ask for dollars for his delegation which he will lead in New York. He proposes to pass through London from Cairo next Sunday. In the course of conversation he said that nothing in either majority or minority plan would be acceptable, and he would stick to the Arab case for a democratic independent Palestine as so often presented. He added that if British were to declare their intention of evacuating Palestine, the clamour for new Jewish State would die down and Arabs would be ready to reach an (?sgreement) with Jews. In that event the Arabs would have no cause to fight, but would be ready if the Jews wanted to. All this was in Jamal's usual style.

ll. The proposal to entrust administration of Jerusalem to United Nations seems to me sound in theory. Presumebly three United Nation members of Economic Board would reside in Jerusalem (where Board would have its headquarters) and would be drawn from states which are members of Trusteeship Council of Which they would be in effect a local projection. In regard to finance and personnel, it might be desirable to have two Commissions. On finance, Commission which would have to consider inter alia problems connected with transfer of Currency Board's assets, the Treasury might wish to be represented. The Civil Service Commission would probably find it necessary to set up its own offices in London to assist Colonial Office in disposal of British members of Palestine Service. There would be no necessity for these Commissions to reach any decisions before the appointed day.

FO 371/61878

12. You will have noted the majority do not recommend that inhabitants of Jerusalem should have nationality as such. It may be necessary to provide that they should, to cover Palestinian citizens who are neither Arabs nor Jews,

"Partition seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate peace. We can see none in any other plan". Anyone who still entertains doubts should look again at chapter XX of the Peel Report. There is really no practicable alternative which will provide for increased immigration rate of 6,250 monthly with effect from 1st September, 1947. In the face of recommendations now made for this new rate it is difficult to see how it will be possible to avoid agreeing to it as part of any general decision. Since new quota will run from lat September there will be a backlog by the time a decision is taken, and we should insist that Agency's power of selection is exercised so as to clear Cyprus camps first. We also propose that cost of these during (corrupt group) deducted from financial assets distributable to Jewish State.

Distributed to: -

R. 243 Secretary of State.

Sir T. Lloyd. Mr. I. Thomas.

Sir C. Caine.

Sir C. Jeffries.

Mr. Martin. Mr. Holding.

Mr. Trafford Smith.

Mr. Gutch. Mr. Mathieson.

Mr. Higham.

Mr. Bennett.

Foreign Office

- Mr. H. Beeley.

TELEGRAM INWARD

Amendment on second page underlined)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTIME (O.A.G.)

18 SEF 1947

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D.12th September, 1947. R.13th

07.00 hrs.

No. 1726 Top Secret.

My telegrem No. 1691.

Following for Martin.

We have examined the boundaries of the Jewish State as recommended by the United Nations Committee with a view to reducing the Arab population by at least 100,000. The following suggestions do not relate to Beershebs area and Nogev. The Committee's proposals for that area appear to stand or fall as a whole and there is little to be gained from tinkering with its boundaries which are such as to reduce the room required for new development in other parts of the Jewish State.

First suggestion relates to Jaffa. We proposed that Jaffa (corrupt group ? minus) its Jewish quarters should be excluded together with a corridor from Arab State bounded by railway on the North and by southern side of Jaffa - Ramleh road on the South. Point of contact between the two portions of the Jewish State could be secured at Beit Dajan whence a new road (not marked on some maps) forms an important link northeastwards with El Yahudiya. In spite of the general objection to corridors this method of linking Jaffa with Arab State would be preferable to alternative of narrow tongue from the south including mostly sand dunes ?at Bat Yam and no means of communication. Corridor area proposed includes 11,000 Arabs and no Jews. This proposal would exclude 82,000 Arabs.

3. Second suggestion is that boundary should follow rellway from Tulkarm to Wilhelma. This would exclude 9,000 Arabs and no Jews and provide north - south road communication within the Arab States (Qalqilya and Majdal Yaba are linked by road).

4. Thirdly, boundary east of Hadera should follow western boundaries of the villages Zeitz, Jatt and Baqa El Charbiya linking up with the boundary proposed in report at a point nearly due east 60 kilos on railway. This is entirely Arab country and contains 5,600 Arabs and no Jews.

Fourthly, southwest of Wazareth, villages Yafa, El Mujeidil and Malul should be in Arab State. Boundary west of Malul would run across base of the tongue of Jewish land which includes King George Forrest. Yafa is a suburb of Nazareth and it is desirable to include source of Nazareth water supply. This would exclude 3,700 Arabs and 220 Jews.

- 6. Fifthly, between Nazareth and Safad, callent including Eilabun and Maghar and El Mansura should be excluded by drawing line roughly from Nimria to western corner of Esh Shuna. This would exclude 2,700 Arabs and no Jews and include north south road in Arab State.
- 7. Sixthly, it might be desirable to exclude Teitaba, Ammuqa, Dallata, Rihaniya, Alma and Deishum and to include (repeat include) Kl Malikiya. This would give natural topographical frontier and exclude 2,860 Arabs, less 360 in Malikiya, net reduction of \$2,500.
- 8. These proposals give a total reduction of 105,500 Arabs and virtually no Jews, leaving a settled Arab population of only 300,000 in Jewish State.
- 9. I have no comments of importance on other parts of boundaries. Ends.

Correction received 16th September.

Distributed to:-/

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1 2 3 4 5 6

Reference: FO 371 61878

Distributed to:

Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
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Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Bennett
Foreign Office

Sir A. Camminghem

Mr. Beeley.

78872/154/11/47 Cypher (0.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

FROM S. OF S. COLONIES.

Sent 13th September, 1947, 15,30 hrs.

TAMEDIATE

No. 2167 Top Secret.

Your telegram No. 1691 Top Secret and Personal.

Following from Martin.

You may now be in a position to give a rather fuller appreciation of local Arab reactions to U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations

- (a) at present and
- (b) to be expected in event of decision to carry out majority plan.

This would be particularly valuable before discussions which are to take place here next week to determine the line to be adopted by the U.K. Delegation to the General Assembly. In the light of U.K. press comment on report it would be specially interesting to know if the widespread feeling that the time had now some for Britain to withdraw from that the time had now some for Britain to withdraw from Palestine had been appreciated by the Arabs of Palestine and if so with what reactions.

boundaries of the majority plan with a view to making the scheme more palatable to the Araba. Details of those suggested modifications will shortly be a moveyed to you by suggested modifications will shortly be a moveyed to you by modifications, particularly with relation to Jaffa and modifications, particularly with relation to Jaffa and modifications, particularly with relation to Jaffa and seraheba. Modifications so far suggested here do not affect Beersheba but nevertheless effect a population transfer of about 140,000 Araba and 3,000 Jawa to the Arab transfer of about 140,000 Araba and 3,000 Jawa to the Arab on the various sections of Arab opinion in Palestine of a modification of this magnitude.

Can we say that there is a reasonable prospect that we could implement the plan modified to this extent without producing disorders on such a scale as (a) to involve an unacceptable military commitment and/or (b) to be likely to lead to active intervention from neighbouring Arab states?

Distributed to:-

Recretary of State

Sir T. Lloyd Mr. I. Thomas

er. I. Thomas Sir S. Caino

Bir C. Jeffries Mr. Rolding Mr. Martin

Mr. Trafford Smith

Mr. Gutch

Mr. Mathiogon

Mr. Highem

Mr. Memett Mr. MacHillivrey Reference: **FO** 371 61878

Enlis 16 E

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

TO S. OF S. GOLONIES.

D.16th September, 1947. R.16th "23.00 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 1746 Top Secret and Personal.

Your telegram No. 2167.

Following for Martin.

Your paragraph 1. More mature Arab reactions are substantially the same as those indicated in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 1670. There is general disbelief that Great Britain has any intention whatsoever of evacuating Palestine in two years or, indeed, for very much longer period. This alone is considered sufficient to preclude implementation of the majority scheme; that additional comfort is derived from the belief that it will be impossible to find a two-thirds majority in U.N.O. (specially in view of the assumed British rejection) for any scheme placing so large a proportion of Arabs in the Jewish State. In illustration of the virtual universality of the assumption that majority proposals are still born may be mentioned the absence of even token strike against the Report such as was observed in protest at the Report of the Anglo-American Committee.

professed scepticism is largely genuine; the Arabs have not forgotten that the partition proposals of the Royal Commission came to nothing after they had seemed to reach finality; nor has the failure to implement the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee on immigration been unremarked. While there is thus all but universal conviction that British evacuation is not a serious possibility, it is evident, from conversations with those prepared to entertain as hypothetical the possibility of

implementation/

RECEIVED IN C.B

2.2 SEP 1947

SENT TO DEPT.

implementation of majority proposals, that the responsibility for such a decision by U.N.O. will be laid by the Arabs on Britain and that, even if Britain opposes the plan in U.N.O. and declines herself to carry it out, the odium will fall upon her. We must, I think, be prepared to face the fact that, if the majority proposals of U.N.S.C.O.P. were carried out, what is left of the good name of Great Britain amongst Palestine Arabs would be lost, probably irrevocably.

proposals would be resisted by the Arabs with violence. This would be organised and co-ordinated by a High Command under the Arab Higher Committee. Such violent opposition would be to the limit of Palestine Arabs' capacity and would be on scale as extensive as 1937-1939 and a good deal more intensive, since Arab armaments are now much improved, some percentage of the Arabs have had Military training and much has been learnt from Jewish terrorists. Probable course of disturbances would be:

(a) Comparitively small (group omitted ?attacks on) Jewish settlements and on communications.

(b) Simultaneously with this, the existing framework of the Command would be completed and perfected, with Headquarters (probably in Syria) and a Field Command in Palestine.

(c) A period of relative quiet would follow to gauge Government and Jewish reactions and to complete preparations for more widespread disorders by liquidation of opposition elements and intensive propaganda, fund-raising and recruiting in Palestine villages, with simultaneous activities in Arab States.

(d) Final stage would be universal rebellion in Arab areas with attacks on Jewish colonies, communications, Government installations, troop formations and Government officials.

4. Your paragraph 2.

The official Arab line is, as you know, to reject partition on principle. It is extremely difficult to assess whether this rejection is purely tactical, and whether a form of partition giving to the Jews little more than

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than they hold already will be acceptable. It seems to be the view of those qualified to express opinion that, given such a partition, the Arabs of Palestine would follow the Arab Higher Committee, and that the Arab Higher Committee would follow the Mufti. Latter's attitude is, therefore, decisive factor. On information available there are grounds for hope that some partition would be made acceptable to Haj Amin or at least that he could be persuaded to limit opposition to merely verbal protest, provided that his own position as head of an independent Arab State were assured.

partition could secure the Mufti's acquiescence. First, it goes without saying that Jaffa must be excluded. Secondly, I question whether he could consider the exclusion of Negev from the Arab State. This issue rouses passions scarcely less fervent than that of Jaffa; and these are not merely local passions - indeed, feeling on this subject amongst the Bedouins of Beershebs is probably less acute than among the townsmen of Jerusalem and the villages of Samaria. Even the Mufti, in my opinion, could not induce the Arabs of Palestine to accept such a scheme.

6. I realize the difficulty of attempting to secure acceptance by U.N.O. of a partition acheme in which Negew as well as Jaffa is ellotted to the Arab State. I suggest that perhaps prospects might be improved were it to be stipulated that while Negew were allotted to the Arabs, Jews should be permitted to buy land and settle there. This would solve both general and local Arab amour propre - a large factor in the Negew issue; would protect the interests of large land-owners of Gaza and Khan Yunis, who own property in legal cover of the present considerable continuation with legal cover of the present considerable clandestine sales of this area but might accept the plan suggested above as pis aller rather than reject partition altogether.

would involve unacceptable Military commitments. I have intimated in paragraph 4 that all depends on the attitude of the Mufti, which we cannot at present predict. I am, however, endeavouring to ascertain it through existing Palestine Police contacts of great delicacy. If his acquisecence were procured, no substantial trouble need be anticipated. If his acquisecence were

were not, we must expect series of rebellions on the line a indicated in paragraph 3. Suppression of reballions on this scale must involve unacceptable Military commitments. I need not stress the political effects, which you undoubtedly appreciate.

I do not feel adequately qualified to predict the reactions of the Arab states to potential rebellion in Palestine on the issue of partition; and no doubt the Foreign Office will consult His Majesty's representatives. own view, for what it is worth, is that no Arab Government would long survive which failed to lend Palestine Arabs in revolt all support short of open war. Government of Iraq might be disinclined to assist a movement headed by the Mufti; but popular feeling would probably force it to take the same line as other Arab states.

Aid to Arab rebels in Palestine would probably be accompanied by extensive pogroms of Jewish communities throughout the Arab world.

In generalisation about the Arab Command(?States), some exceptions must be made in the case of Trans-Jorden. As indicated in Pirie-Gordon's telegram No. 275 to the Foreign Office, (?Prime Minister) would be prepared to accept the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority partition scheme if Jews could be deprived of Jaffa and the greater part of Negev, King Abdullah is believed to be in favour of a reasonable partition and the Government of Trans-Jordan would probably resist pressure of such public opinion as exists there.

Distributed to: -

R.243 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. I. Thomas Sir S. Caine

Sir C. Joffries

Mr. Holding Mr. Martin

Mr. Trafford Smith

Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson

Mr. Highem Mr. Galeworthy

Sir Alan Cunningham

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

pw E

8346 95-1 31

Cypher (0.T.P.)

24 SEP 1941

INTEXEM

TO PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 18th September, 1947. 18.45 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2211 Top Secret and Personal. Morning.

Following for Gurney from Cunningham.

Your telegram No. 1746 to Martin is of great interest and importance at the present moment. From it I gain the impression that you and the political branch are now of the opinion that the Arabs are much nearer organised revolt than was thought when I left, but I assume the Government is still of the view you have expressed previously that with certain adjustments the Majority plan is workable. In particular your paragraph 3, which I have assumed refers to the Majority plan without modification, forecasts a possible sequence of events, but in considering this sequence I feel we must also take account of the effect of counter action by ourselves. I was up to now convinced that resolute and quick action in picking up the leaders should enable us to prevent stage (b) in your paragraph 3 being reached at the very least, before some considerable period elapsed. If you in Palestine have any changed ideas on this matter would you let me know.

regarding the U.N.S.C.O.P. report is generally in accordance with my own views and I had already made the point regarding the importance of the Mufti and the possibility of getting agreement with him. I also agree that some special arrangement is required for the Negeb. It might interest you to know that I told weizmann that there was bound to be difficulty regarding the Beersheba sub district and Jaffa. I found he fully agreed and his view was that the Jews should make a gesture and suggest

themselves/

themselves they should be given up. I know they do not want Jaffa but I imagine Weizmann will have uphill work trying to persuade Ben Gurion regarding Beersheba.

5. I note you say that an attempt is being made to ascertain the views of the Mufti through police contacts. You will I know be as impressed as I am with the necessity of keeping such a delicate matter completely non-Governmental and non-commital at this time.

4. If you can, please reply to this telegram by Saturday morning when there is an important meeting.

Distributed to:

R. 243 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. I. Thomas Sir S. Caine Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Holding Mr. Martin Foreign Office

Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson Mr. Higham Mr. Galsworthy Sir A. Cunningham

Mr. H. Beeley.

24 SEP 1947

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D.19th September, 1947. R.19th "

17.55 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 1768 Top Secret and Personal.

Your telegram No. 2211.

Following for Sir Alan Gunningham.

we do not mean to suggest that sequence of events culminating in organised revolt would be vary quicker than was thought when you left. In fact (d) would take at least 4 or 5 months to develop after announcement of declaion.

stage (b), but we could of course delay it if we are prepared to face the fact that in picking up the Arab leaders we should at once divert Arab hostility from the Jews to ourselves, and should from that point, be represented as enemies equally with the Jews. Palestine Arabs would be very reductant in their resistance to take this direction, partly because of genuine friendliness, and partly because they know that the British forces are incomparably stronger than in 1957. Arab leaders already outside Palestine would bet take long to find substitutes for those picked up. When the time came, it might be better to exclude the Palestine leaders from Palestine as and when they leave it rather than precipitate events by arresting and detaining people who would be replaced.

plen without medification. Consequences of medified plan wealth depend on Mufti. What would weigh with him, and with Arabs generally, would be declaration by his Majesty's Government that

* Long!

they would in any case give up government of Palestine by a definite date. In reply to paragraph 5 of your telegram, I had impressed personally upon (word of 5 letters corrupt) great importance of points which you make and these are well understood.

4. My telegram No. 1745 was based on views of Political Branch and C.I.D. material. Personally, I think it is a little pessimistic. We all consider majority plan with, repeat with, modifications is workeble but once decision is taken speed will be vital.

DISCINDUEGO 60:

R. 243

Secretary of State

Sir T. Lloyd

Mr. Mathieson

Mr. Higher

Sir S. Caine

Mr. Galeworthy

Sir C. Jeffries

Mr. Holding

Mr. Holding

Mr. Holding

Mr. Martin

Foreign Office

Mr. Beoley.

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Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (O.A.G.)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 22nd September, 1947. R. 22nd " " 20.55 hrs.

No.1786 Top Secret and Personal.

My telegram of 19th September.

Following for Sir Alan Cunningham. Begins.

Contact with the Mufti has reported that he is still irrevocably opposed to any partition scheme whatever modification might be offered. He appears supremely confident in the strength of his position. should reject partition or any other scheme giving the Zionists that political foothold which they want in order to realise their ultimate sims. Were Britain to take such a stand she would have Arab entente in a moment. Britain has done a great deal for It was little to ask. the Jews. Let her merely refrain from doing any more in Palestine. We do not ask Britain to undo the past. Those are conditions. Decide whether you will continue to support political Zionism. If you do, you can never hope for Arab co-operation, for (?Arabs) would be co-operating in bringing about their own destruction. As regards the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine we would not We do not fear the Jews. We might lose at first. mind. We would have many losses, but in the end should win...... leave us to fight it out ourselves.

2. In short, there is no sign of his uncompositing attitude being weakened by any personal prospects for himself. Ends.

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Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Sir A. Cunningham
Mr. Fitzgerald
Foreign Office

- Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

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Registry [8346 9513/

OUTTLE

92

F.O.

Despatched 2

М.

/military

Draft.

Secret.

Confidential.
Restricted.

Sir A. Cadogan, New York.

Telegram.

No. 3/62

(Date) Sep 5

Repeat to:

En Clair. Codo: Cypher.

Distribution :--

Depth. no.

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Coloniel Offices:

MOST IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Following for Martin from Mathieson, Colonial Office. N.P. Gurney's reaction to drait statement has now been received. He assumes that statement is intended to force on both Jews and Arabs realization that they must now reach agreement. Failing that he thinks that it will be feasible to abandon most or Palestine to chaos and disorder but that Christianity would surely expect us to see that Jerusalem and its Holy Places are not handed over to be fought for between Moslems and Jews. In this connexion he has in mind position of British ranks of police, who he states are in fact the only people available to maintain law and order in Jerusalem with or without

Reference: FO 371/61878

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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faced with disabandonment and most

thankless job in the meantime.

extinates the effect on the British section of the Palestine Police Force of announcement as it must be realized that this is only prelude to general depate and is not in itself conclusive. Announcement regarding return of families which High Commissioner intends to make immediately on return may help to raise morale. Future of police is of course being covered in statement to be issued regarding future of British officers in realestine, text of which will be telegraphed to you separately. This will presumably also offset effect envisaged by Gurney.

OTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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JB Sept. 25

Secret Cypher/OTF

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3162

25th September, 1947 D. 2.40 p.m. 25th September, 1947

88888

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Fellowing for Martin from Mathieson, Colonial Office.

Gurney's reaction to draft statement has now been received. He assumes that statement is intended to force on both Jews and Arabs realisation that they must new reach agreement. Failing that he thinks that it will be feasible te abanden mest of Palestine to chaes and disorder but that Christianity would surely expect us to see that Jerusalem and its Hely Places are not handed ever to be fought for between Meslems and Jews. In this connexion he has in mind position of British ranks of police, who he states are in fact the only people available to maintain law and order in Jerusalem with or without military assistance. He expects large-scale resignations of British police on publication of statement and would be reluctant to attempt to held British ranks under Compulsory Service powers. He feels that prespect of continued service in Jerusalem would greatly help merale in force which would otherwise see itself faced with disbandment and most thankless jeb in the meantime.

2. We feel here that Gurney perhaps everestimates the effect on the British section of the Palestine Police Force of announcement as it must be realised that this is only prelude to general debate and is not in itself conclusive. Announcement regarding return of families which High Comissioner intends to make immediately on return may help to raise morale. Future of police is of course being covered in statement to be issued regarding future of British officers in Palestine, text of which will be telegraphed to you separately. This will presumably also offset effect envisaged by Gurney.

11-8 1947 Registry 835/197/31. FROM Royal plantamite Transpordan! Legalier Dated Received in Registry Last Paper 8746 References (Print) (How disposed of) For Person was terry roturn Lyt 13th

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Copy of Statement mode by Françoiden

Prime Minister, & U.N.S.Co.P. or Luly 24,

at Foruga Oppie, Claman.

On the whole a good statement

Co. for period and return.

11/5

(Action completed)

Next Paper

8 7 5 7

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E 8351

with the compliments of the Transjordan Legation,
London, 9th September 1947



"

STATEMENT MADE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRIME MINISTER OF TRANSJORDAN, TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR PALESTINE, ON THE 24th JULY 1947, AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AMMAN.

Ir. Chairman, Honourable Members.


It is a pleasure to me to have this opportunity to extend to you, on behalf of the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan, an expression of welcome to this country and to thank you for the trouble you have taken to pay us this visit in the midst of all your preoccupations and with the limited space of time that remains at your disposal.

The case for which you have come to hear our views is undoubtedly one of singular importance and unique character. No one can, in the least, hesitate to appreciate the serious quality of the task which has been allotted to you nor the grave responsibilities which are involved therein. Nevertheless, after we know that you have accepted to carry out this difficult task and to undertake these heavy responsibilities, let us sincerely hope that you will prove capable of finding your way through to the just solution of the problem which at present rests in your hands.

Too much has been said and written about the Palestine question and you, yourselves, must have certainly heard and read a great deal about this question. The literature that has been written, so far on the Palestine case may perhaps be the biggest in volume ever written in the history of the world on any one subject. And yet, to men who search for realism and seek justice in its most primitive form, this case stands so simple, so clear, so strong, that it only needs a pure consience, a sense of impartiality and a desire to be fair to be able to settle it. It is in a short phrase the case of a people who simply ask that they should be allowed to live freely and peacefully in their own homeland which they have kept for so many generations and which they are not prepared to surrender by their own free will to a stranger community aiming at invading the land with all the powerful means they possess and with the support of an influential part of the civilized world.

It is most unfortunate that the land which has been subject to such a tragedy should be the Holy Land, the dearest and most sacred, in the northern parts of the Arabian Home.

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I have referred to the numerous reports which have been written on the Palestine question, and I do not, therefore, intend to bore you with a repetition of all the arguments in favour of the Arab case in Palestine. I only wish to discuss here two fundamental points bearing on the issue: Firstly, the Balfour Declaration, which has created the problem, and, secondly, the right of Palestine to enjoy its independance in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION:

In November, 1917, the British Government issued a declaration, which was given the name of its author, and in which the British Government promised to view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a Jovash National Home for the Jewish people and, with a safeguard for the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish inhabitants, to use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object. I desire to challenge the logality and validity of this declaration. The declaration was given without the knowledge and without the consent of the Arabs who are the owners of the land. It was given by the British Government who, at the time of the declaration, did not possess any right whatsonvor in the country. Moreover, it was given at a time when the British Government Itself was fighting side by side in the descrt with the Arabs under King Hussein for their liberation from the Ottoman regime.

The British Government by unilateral declaration in which the people of the country were not consulted, undertook to make for the Jews in Palestine a national home. The reason for that undertaking was understood to have been the fact that about two thousand years previously, the Jews for various periods tatalling approximately 300 years, had been among the various races then living in Palestine. On this analogy, it would seem equally justifiable that because in the course of some European War British Forces had succeeded in occupying Spain, that they should offer to facilitate in that country a national home for the Arabs. The only difference would be that in such a case the Arabs could claim that they only left Spain 500 years ago after an occupation of some 700 years, more than twice the period which the Jews had succeeded in the maintaining themselves in Palestine and then, mainly in the arid hill areas of the country.

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It may be argued, in this connection, that the Balfour Declaration was, at a later date, embodied in the Mandate given to Great Britain by the predecessor of the International Organization to which Your Honourable Committee belongs, i.e., the League of Nations. To this I would reply that not a single Arab State or Arab Government was represented in the League at the time when the Mandates system was invented and the mandates were given to the Great Powere; thus, the unilateral action of Great Britain remains still illegal and invalid even in the face of this international sanction.

Furthermore, when the implication of the Balfour Declaration became known not only did the Palestine Arabs protest vociforously at what they could not but regard as an outrage, but also all the Arabs of neighbouring countries united with the cause of their brothers in Palestine. Even the venerable King Hussein felt impelled to voice his protest against this action of his friends and allies the British.

And so I now pass to the years succeeding the establishment of the Mandate and the application of the policy of the Balfour Declaration. It is true that during those years there were disturbances. In 1920, in 1921 and again in 1929 the continual friction between the two peoples asserted itself in inevitable but deplorable outbreaks of racial violence and pillage. During those years however, the Arab nation as a whole, not having the gift of reading the future, felt irritated rather than alarmed and more insulted than menaced at this obligatory hospitality given on their behalf to unknown aliens under the auspices of a foreign power. The danger did not then seem great, and at one period in the late twenties the immigration figures had reached so low an ebb that the total did not equal the numbers of those Jews who had found the Promised Land less attractive than they had supposed and had returned to Europe. In those days it seemed that the Jews who wished to take advantage of the facilities so kindly offered by the British, were mainly a relatively few enthusiasts for their race or fanatics for their faith, who wore prepared to throw over an established position in Europe in order to cultivate some barren or swampy acre of land in Palestine. They came, they had money behind them; they produced settlements. In those days however, the situation, while deregotary to the dignity of the Arabs as the people of the country, could not then be regarded as actively dangerous.

A Jewish witness before the Peel Commission of 1936 stated that the Jews were the salt of the Earth but it was known that an excess of salt would turn the stomach. The Palestine of 1918 may well have been in need of a little salt, the distrubances of 1929 showed the first bilious attack of a turning stomack and by 1936 blood poisoning had set in.

The full gravity of the situation was brought about by events extraneous to Palestine, the Arab world or the Mandatory Power. In 1933 Hitler became supreme in Germany and the ghastly persecution of the Jewish race began. Jews were forced to leave the Reich. At that time most European states suffered from unemployment problems and the Trade Union interests were generally sufficient to ensure that immigration of refugees in Europe did not take place. There was however one country where these unfortunates could find sanctuary. One country where Labour laws did not stop their entry and where the authorities were prepared to give thom assistance and protection. That country was Palestine. Immigration which had declined so far in the late twenties suddenly mounted to unprecedented proportions. In the year 1935 alone 60,000 Jews from Europe were added to the population. Then indeed the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring countries ceased to be merely passively resentful and became actively alarmed.

Then came the sad and dreary story so well known to all of us. - The spontaneous Arab rising of 1936. - The Peel Commission which recommended Partition. - The Woodhead Commission which showed it was impracticable.

Then followed further Arab disturbances of 1938, and the counter measures of the British Government. The Round Table Conference which resulted in the White Paper of 1939 whereby the British Government put a period to immigration, limited land sales and promised eventual independence. This White Paper so bitterly attacked by the Zionists, also admitted that the establishment of the National Home was no longer to be implemented after the exhaustion of the Immigration quota that was then laid down. Jewish pressure however seems to have been sufficient to induce the British to break their own proposals in this respect.

In 1939 came the War with the results for the Jews of Europe that we all know. Mr. Chairman - the Arabs, by that ghastly tragedy of European Jewry, have been put by the force of events in a position which is none of their choosing and which is both unjust and unmerited. We Arabs are a simple people,

 and a kindly people; while we are capable of fanaticism we are also capable of generosity. The fate of the European Jews - not as Jews but as human beings - is a thing that has shocked Arabs at least equally deeply as it has shocked the rest of the civilized world. As a result of barbarism unbelievable in these days the pathetic remaints of a once flourishing race now seek, what the Jewish Agency informs us is the only sanctuary available for them; Palestine. The only reason that they cannot get there, we are again informed by the Jewish Agency, is the heartless intransigence of the Arabs who, blinded by their own nationalism, and supported for purely political and strategical reasons by the British, are determined to refuse to those unfortunates that succour which in common humanity would seem to be their due.

Mr. Chairman. I put it to you as an eminent jurist and a citizen of the world - is this a fair and reasonable burden to lay upon the Arabs? The Jews of Germany and of occupied Europ have been subjected to a degree of persecution which for shoer friendiabness is unparelled in the history of the world. By whom? By a Ulmistian nation of the West. Such chances of re-establishing themselves as they may have had after such butchery have largely been lost through the material destruction of war waged by other Christian nations of the dest, fighting as they were for bare survival. The remnant of these unhappy people must admittedly be cared for, but we are told that those who must bear the burden of their rehabilitation are not the Christian nations of the West who caused the disaster, but the Arabs of Palestine who have persecuted nobody and who ask only to be left in peace. When they object to this imposition they are told that they are heartless and selfish nationalists. I do not feel that the persecution of these miserable people from Europe can be relieved by subjecting the Palestine Arabs to the inevitable persecution that will follow from the reinforcement of the resurgent strength and authority of official Zionism.

The problem of the Displaced Persons is a world problem and the Arabs will play their part, and will assist the nations of the world in dealing with the difficulty in their own way, and will bear the burden proportionately to their numbers. When the Zionist leaders attempted to make capital out of sufferings of their co-religionists in order to strong bear the artificial power of Zionism in Polactine, the mabs have no alternative but to resist.

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The present position is ubcarable. The Balfour Doclaration, which I have already shown we cannot recognise, is invoked to force on an Arab land a foreign invasion only made possible by a set of circumstances in Europe undreamed of by those who actually framed the declaration, a set of circumstances which are now explcited to the full by Zionist leaders for purely political ends. Palestine is not the answer to the problem of the Displaced Persons and while the Arabs will do their fair share they will not be forced by outside digitation to bear the whole burden of a problem created in the West by the nations of the west.

THE RIGHT OF PALESTINE TO SELF-DETERMINATION:

I now turn to the question of the only principles on which all mandates can be justified. The object of a mandate is that some power grown old in experience and knowledge of administration should act during a period of years as a guide and tutor to a young nation which has no previous or recent experience of standing by itself. This period of tutelage should only last until such a time as whatever organization, whether it be the League of Nations or the United Nations, as has granted the mandatory power the right of exercising its functions, is satisfied that the young nation has reached maturity.

After the last war mandates in the Middle East were granted to Great Britain in respect of Iraq, Transjordan and Falestine, to France in respect of Syria and the Lebanon. Very early Iraq achieved its independance. After the end of the Second World War France withdrew from Syria and the Lebanon and a few months later Great Britain handed over her responsibilities in Trans-Jordan. The only arab country that remains under the tutelage of a European power is Palestine. Mr. Chairman: Is it possible seriously to maintain that the Arabs of Palestine are less mature politically or less capable of being captains of their souls than the Arabs of their sister countries in Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan?

You will agree that any suggestion that Palestine Arabs are somehow less trustworthy than other Arabs is purely fantastic, and we are left with the conclusion that it is all too obvious that the only reason why they cannot enjoy the same privilege as their brothers is that they have had the misfortune to live in a tract of territory that has been arbitrarily designated by a Foreign power as a "national home" for an alien race. I do not think that on grounds of the most elementary equity it can be contended that the Palestine Arabs having been subjected to injury can as a coralory to that injury be denied what is a natural right enjoyed by all the civilized nations of the world. It would be equally just to deprive a man of his franchise at an election on the ground that his mother-in-law who disagreed with him politically had insisted on having accommodation in his house.

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so much for the problem itself. I now turn to the even greater problem of a solution. During a quarter of century various and differing proposals have been put forward, some of which have been accepted by one side but none by both and all appear to have been conclusively proved by the experts to be unworkable or impracticable. Of these various solutions proposed there appear in practice to be five alternatives:— The first is a continuation of the existing mandatory system either under Great Britain, some other single power or an international body. This solution, in my contention would be unjust in as much as would deprive, as I have already described, Palestine of its right to independence.

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The second alternative is that a Jewish State should be set up in the whole of Palestine and this is a possibility which I am not prepared to discuss.

The third is partition. In 1936, the Reyal Commission on Palestine, known as the Peel Commission, after many months of careful study, came to the unanimous conclusion that the only answer to the problem was partition. Unfortunately, members of the Commission did not work out the details as to how this end could be achieved, and while making the astonishing suggestion that practically the whole of the mainly Arab District of Galilee should be in the Jewish State, they non-the-less left to a technical commission to be subsequently appointed, the precise details as to how their proposal should be implemented. In due course, the technical commission arrived in the country under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead and recommended with equal unanimity that the proposals of the Royal Commission were unworkable. In any event there would not appear to be, on the merits of the Arab case as I have endeavoured to explain to you, the slightest justification for this course.

The fourth alternative is what is generally described as the Bi-National State. This is a proposal which on the face of it has a certain suggestion of sweet reasonableness which would commend itself to men of good will but regrettable ignorance. In the remarks that I am now going to make, I wish it to be clearly understood that those whom I am attacking are the Zionis leaders and their followers, who are not, I can assure you, representative of the Jews of the world or even those of Palestine. There is, as you have noticed for yourselves, an element of hysteria in the presentation of the zionist case which is all too reminiscent of the nationalist hysteria which we have seen to our eternal cost olsowhere. Zionism does not appear to be a simple political faith gencepred only with saving those porsecuted and distressed in the land of the foreigner, but it has become for its believers, a religion, and as a religion it has all the concomitants of fanaticism, cruelty and persecution. That zion should rule again in the promised land, which incidentally I understand includes Trans-Jordan, is a matter not of reason or expediency but of blind burning faith. All this may be very admirable if one happens to be a zionist, but it is a matter, to put it mildly, of anxiety to Arabs and of acute danger to those Jews - and they are not few who happen to have their homes in Palestine and who ask nothing more than to dwell in peace with their Arab friends, as they lived before.

I do not need to draw your attention in detail to the various atrocities committed by Jews in Palestine during the last two years, as you would have received details of them from other sources. But there is an aspect of the matter, however, which I think, has been insufficiently stressed. Every time a particularly revolting murder of innocent soldiers, police or officials takes place in that country, the Jewish national institutions hasten to express their horror and amazement that such events should have occurred and to disassociate themselves with the perpetrators. The fact remains, however, that the outrages continue, arrests are seldom made owing to the protection given to the criminals either through sympathy or fear by the Jewish public and the national institutions have themselves stated that, while in certain ill-defined circumstances, they might be prepared to take action against the dissidents, they are not willing to co-operate with

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the legally constituted forces of the country in bringing a Jew to justice. As a single example of this attitude, I would quote a statement of a certain Mrs. Goldie Mayerson, a high official of the Jewish Agency, who was reported in the Times of January 22nd of this year as having stated to press correspondents that the time had not yet come when Jewish passers-by could be expected to intervene on behalf of Britishers who who were being attacked in the public streets.

Again, we have heard that this large armed force that goes under the name of the "Haganah" and over which the Mandatory Power appears to have no control but which with the patience excelling even that of the prophet "Jobe", is prepared to tolerate in its midst, is in fact under the general direction of the Jowish Agency. The British press appear to be under the impression that it is a benevolent organization which, if only treated fairly, will emerge and rid the country of the terrorists. Frankly, I can find little basis to this supposition; in fact, 1t was only a year ago that its activities induced even the British Government to imprison the leading members of the Jewish Agency. The reasons for the imprisonments were set out in a white paper published shortly afterwards and cited various acts of violence perpetrated by the Haganah on on the Agency instructions. For some reason which is not altogether clear, the Agency leaders were released a few months afterwards, but among other efforts, besides those enumerated in the white paper, the Haganah openly boasted responsibility for blowing up all the bridges across the Jordan and in the last few days have done considerable damage to various military installations in Haifa. On the occasions when members of the terrorist organizations are finally brought tobook and sentenced to death in accordance with the Laws of the land, the ontire Jewish press as well as the national institutions in Palestine and abroad regard their punishment as some form of insult to Jewry as a whole. The fact was apparently forgotten that the same press and institutions had previously loudly claimed that the dissidents were beyond the pale of "Yishuv" and therefore no security measures or punitive action that in any way inconvenienced the Jews, should be permitted. The answer for the tenderness of heart on behalf of these criminals is that the Jews as a race disapprove of capital punishment. During the Arab disturbances, over 200 Arabs were hanged under the same law as is now occasionally applied to the Jews; but I do not remember, Mr. Chairman, that any strong Jewish protest was voiced on these occasions. By these short comments on the behaviour of the responsible Jewish authorities, I think I have adequately explained my fears at the prospect of co-partnership in equal numbers and on equal terms in a Bi-national State.

The fifth alternative is the termination of the mandate and the immediate establishment of an independent Palestine in the Government of which both Jews and Arabs take part according to their existing numerical proportions. In practice, such an arrangement would obviously mean that the Arab majority would insist on the final stoppage of Jewish immigration.

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You may well ask, Mr. Chairman, how, in view of the facts I have just given you as to the behaviour of the Jowish institutions, I propose that the hab majority in the Palestinian State will have any hope of maintaining even the most elementary law and order, and repelling the hamadas of ships orammed with Jowish illegal immigrants, which even now, are causing such acute embarassment to the Mandatory Power. This is a point on which I demand the co-operation of the august organization which you represent. It is my belief that the present highly organised disturbances in Palestine are in the nature of an almost desperate bid of the zionist Executive to take advantage of the current misery and despair of the Jews in Europe to force their own policy in Palestine. The Zionists are able to marshal impressive numbers of these unhappy creatures to Say that their one aim is to go to Palestine.

Mr. Chairman; of course they can. These men and women are rotting in the very camps in which they suffered so much under Nazi oppression. The war is over two years and inspite of the desperate shortage of labour in nearly all countries of Europe. it, nevertheless, seems that no one is willing to give a welcome to these people. The representatives of the Jewish Agency tirelessly tour these camps, and indeed all Europe, and assure these luckless people that a home and friends and work are waiting for them if only by some means they can break through the wilful obstructionism of the British Government. Can you expect them to take any other course than to accept this one chance that appears to be open to them as an alternative to the conditions in which they have been living during the past terrible years? This, Mr. Chairman, is the attitude of mind that the Jevrish Agency assure you is a genuine zionist passion. It is to you that we look to settle these people in France, Italy, England, in the Soviet-controlled countries, in the United States, the South American Republics and even, if I may suggest it, in Sweden. These people will take a chance of a fresh life wherever it is offered them, but, at present, it appears to be offered them only in Palestine; and that by a minority of the population for political reasons of the most sinister type.

Once you have accomplished this task which is one that should be carried out immediately and during the transitory period while the Mandatory Administration is handing over to the Palestinen State, you will find that the Jewish problem and the Palestine problem have solved themselves. You will have deprived the zionist Executive of its ammunition of human bodies and the immigration problem will be more, as apart from the very few genuine enthusiasts, there will be no one loft who wishes to immigrate. The Jews now in Palestine, realizing that there is no longer any hope of a Jewish State or an absolute majority or the possibility of removing the Arabs from their land do as they have so often done before in their long history and adapt themselves to

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circumstances. There are Jewish minorities living peaceably and happily in most Arab countries as they have done in Palestine itself for centuries past, even under the rule of the Ottoman Sultans. Before the days of Zionism little Jewish communities, both in the towns and in the remote country-side lived in peace and prosperity, untroubled by national yearnings and in perfect accord with their arab neighbours. I see no reason, Mr. Chairman, why this same prosperity and happiness should not be repeated on a larger scale with the Jews now in Palestine and having a share in the Government over previously enjoyed by them in that country or elsewhere.

That, Mr. Chairman and honourable members, concludes all that I have to say. You have in your hands the future fate of hundreds of thousands of men and wemen. You can attempt to solve the problem on the basis of nationalists aspirations which, I submit, are utterly out of date in the new world that we all so earnestly desire to see. If you attempt to solve it on these lines you will fail; and not only will you fail, but your failure will cause endless strife and a weight of human misery that no man can describe. If, on the other hand, you set aside these nationalists hopes of a people who are not a nation and solve it on a basis of world citizenship and simple common-sense and justice, not only will-you succeed, but you will also earn the blossings of generations yet unborn. You have a high task, Mr. Chairman, and a difficult one, but one which I firmly believe is capable of a just solution.

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Mr. Hayward

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This is the document in spok about this morning.

9 understand from the folmiel Office that Palistinis

requirement will be 3000 copies, of which 500 an needed argently.

The Report will be followed by an Appendix (which will be a substantial document, I meanly as long, as the Report itself) and by two maps. There are being prepared in New York. There are being prepared in New York. Appendix may reach Gondon in about to a week or time days; the maps

will probably he later.

In view of this delay, and
of the pressing demand for copies
of the Report from the Sabinet and
from members of the public, I hope
the S.D. can be presented to print
in two volumes.

Report prepared for printing & Sent 9
to Printing Dept. (Room 140) for transmission to
So. with statement of our requirements.

All Hayward
919.

So have now recid and locamined the Report of are going ahead with the printing. They now say that the earliest possible moment they can produce page-proofs will be thesday 16th Sept & they will send us 30 (for Cabinet, vo.) by that date. They say they will expect brown agents to pay by the 3000 copies to be supplied to Palestine, so perhaps

perhaps CD. should be warned about this.

They also ask, in the circs, for an official letter requesting the printing publication. I submit a scraft - which you may amend as necessary which you will have sent off on an appropriate E. paper, after filling in the number of copies required for Departmental disposal?

All Hayward

Later So now report that printing to.

has been allocated to 7.0. Press, so I will
arrange with them to send 30 proof copies
direct to Cabinet Offices.

Pl. let me know if you went Alf15/9.

them sent to anyone by name.)

30 proof copies of the Report were sent to her. Pink at the Cabiner Offices on 16th Sept. for distribution to himisters.

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Volume II containing the Annexes,
Appendices and maps has today gone forward
for printing and publication, though it is not
yet possible to give a date for the latter.

(a want 3,000 espies for the Your. of

CO. want 3,000 espies for the Yorr. of Palestine and 25 for themselves. Ihave also Reportasked for 25 copies, as in the ease of the Report proper, for Eastern Dept:

Cabinet Offices however do not want 30 proof copies for ministers, it sufficing for heir purposes to wait for publication for heir purposes to wait for publication then bry what copies of the Aky App. + Ms. They may require.

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11th September, 194

sir,

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Bevin to request that arrangements may be made for the immediate printing and publication for sale as a non-Parliamentary Publication of the Report by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, signed at Geneva. 31st August. 1947.

- The text of the Report has already been sent to your Department and it will be followed by the Appendix and maps in due course, but Mr. Bovin will be glad if you will give priority to the publication of the Report itself and suggests that the subsidiary documents be published in a separate volume when they become available.
- I am further to request that 3000 copies of the Report may be supplied for the Government of Palestine and 25 copies for the Foreign Office.
- It is understood that you will send 30 paro-proof copies of the Report to this Department at the earliest possible moment.

I am sir, Your obedient Servant,

B.a.B. Burrerans

The Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office. 61878

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Library

Sept. 11 , 1944

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you will sproceed with the publication If the Keport itself and suggests that the subsidiary documents le published in a separate volume when they become available. further to request that 3000 copies of the Report

may be supplied for the govt. of Palestine and 25 copies for the Foreign Office.

4. It is understood that you will send 30 page-proof copies of the Report to this Dept. at the earliest possible moment.

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Confidential. Draft. Telegram. UK De gensefur Sept. 10 En Clair. Code. Distribution :-Dyll. no 1. Copies to:

Despetched 23 2 M. mmedeeli. The Stationing Office an printing the man of the United Nations fammiller on Palistin for distribution in This country and in Palistine. 2. Plus sund by air bag, as soon as possible, copies of it Appendix to the report and of the maps illustrating the majority and minority proposals. We understand that the Aprilia

and it is intended that this shall he printed here.

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DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 2997

10th September 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem.

D. 7.23 p.m. 10th September 1947.

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IMMEDIATE.

The Stationery Office are printing the report of the United Nations Committee on Palestine for distribution in this country and in Palestine.

- 2. Please send by air bag, as soon as possible, copies of the Appendix to the report and of the maps illustrating the majority and minority proposals. We understand that the Appendix will contain individual statements by certain members of the Committee. and it is intended that this shall be printed here.
- The Annexes, which we understand will consist principally of records of evidence, will not be required for printing. Please send two copies of these by sea bag to London and two to Jerusalem.

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No. E 8353 /951/31 Despatched > M Top Secret. Most Immediate Confidential. Restricted. My telyam no. 2997 [United Draft. Kel. W Notions Report on Palistini] UNDL New York I understand that we require the formal permission of 3003 Sept 11 the United Nations for reprinting the UNSCOP report in Gondon. Phen therfor ask the Suntarial to authorise this action and to approve (with amondments if byphe they wish) the following statement Dyst. no. 1 with which we intend to proper the document: 2. "Printed with the approved of the Secretary-General of the for C.O. Mr. Hagward, Tihang. United Nations from the text issued in Jeneva on the 8th September. This text may not

f identical in every detail

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edition which is king printed in New York."

3. In making this request,
you should remind the Suntaint
that Marbillivray obtained the
approval of Robbes in Genera for
the printing of an edition in
Palestine. This however has
proved to be impracticable, and
amongments have been made to
supply Palestine from Gendon.

4. Please reply by immediate

telegram not later than Saturday.

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 3003.

D. 2.25 p.m. 11th September, 1947.

11th September, 1947.

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MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 2997 [United Nations Report on Palestine].

I understand that we require the formal permission of the United Nations for reprinting the UNSCOP report in London. Please therefore ask the Secretariat to authorise this action and to approve (with amendments if they wish) the fellowing statement with which we intend to preface the document.

- General of the United Nations from the text issued in Geneva on the 8th September. This text may not be identical in every detail with the authoritative edition which is being printed in New York".
- 5. In making this request, you should remind the Secretariat that MacGillivray obtained the approval of Robles in Geneva for the printing of an edition in Palestine. This, however, has proved to be impracticable, and arrangements have been made to supply Palestine from London.
- 4. Please reply by immediate telegram net later than Saturday.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61878

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INDEXED

8323 817 51

Publication of Report of United Nations Committee.

We have now received two copies of the text of the report of the United Nations Committee on Palestine, without maps or appendices. The report itself covers 165 roneoed pages.

The report should obviously be circulated to Ministers with as little delay as possible. It would be far more convenient) to have it in printed form, and in any event, it will probably have to be printed in this country on account of the demand for copies by Members of Parliament and the public.

I suggest therefore that one of our copies should at once be sent to the Stationery Office for printing either as a White Paper or as an ordinary Stationery Office publication. If this were done, we could then send them a copy of the appendices and maps as soon as we receive them, and these could be brought out as a supplementary volume.

I should be glad to know the Secretary of State's wishes in this matter.

Japan Jahanson Wier

H.Berley

5th September, 1947.

The Stationers, Office have undertaken to frint the Report, and her premises to supply 30 upies in page-proof next Tuesday, for distribution to the balinet. Mr. Hayward

/ is

is asking them to send these copies straight to the betinet officers I should be gratiful if the Private Suntary would warm the appropriate person in the betinet offices that these copies will arrive on Tuesday and shalle be distributed. Timmediately.

Mr. Harricker

Mr. Hageyard to see at the request of mr. Fraser, the 30 proof copies will be sent to mr. C. W. Pink at the babenet offices.

I have informed the Carinet offices (mr. Fraser)

All Hageward

1/9.

Rse McAlpine

RECEIVED IN C.B.

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

En Clair

PROM PALESTINE. (O. A. G.)

D. 17th September, 1947.
R. 17th

18.55 hrs.

INDEXED

No. 1758.

Your telegram No. 2147.

Printing of U.N.S.C.O.P. Report.

Glad to learn at approximately what date first copies may be expected to be received here.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office

- Communications Dept.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

En Clair

FROM PALESTINE. (O.A.G.)

D. 17th September, 1947.

R. 17th

18.55 hrs.

No. 1758.

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THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LON DON

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

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Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office

- Communications Dept.

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

8353 91-1 31 Leport of UNSCOP

128

NDEXED

hu. Deeley The Stationery Office have asked me again today whether we can give them any quidance on the question of charging the cost of the 3000 copies Behe Report which are being supplied to the gove gralestine. If you have not yet discussed this with your Typosite number in the CO, and would like me to do so, will you pl. let me know who he is i I can then also arrange with him for the consignment to be delivered to the proper quarter for onward als. Anyword. transmission.

> I han give Mr. Hayerens Vær information. 1413. 19

-C 371/61878

1947

E | 8374

PALESTINE

M' Descen

Dated

Received in Registry 3 Ref

Palistin Litiation Lis to ha hingleton has offened his reversed should # I want to ask him any question relating to Palesting to was their Boston Rep' on the Argh Menersean Commission of Enguing on Palestine

Last Paper

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References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

Su minute withen

(Action completed) (Index) Next Paper

8375

33538

Minutes. E 8374

Secretary of State

I was rung up today by Sir John Singleton, who was the Chief British Representative on the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Palestine, to say that he was in London for a few days (CENtral 3827), and was at the disposal of yourself and the Foreign Office if there was any question you wished to put to him. emphasised that he was not attempting to interfere in any way in the Palestine question; he merely wished to be of use if required.

John Minner

3rd September. 1947.

M Beeley I have that Six J. Singleton That you will see him.

9 saw Sir John Sing Ction on Salunday morning. His main purpose was to let it he howen that, if the Sunday of State wished to make une of his survives in commention with

the Palistine problem, he would be available.

9 thumbed him for this, and what whether he had any views on the UN bemmitteis uport. His one clear feeling about this was that H.M. Gevenment should declin to accept responsibility for giving effect Is the majority plan.

23 seles

132

1947

FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

Population of arab and Temil States under Federal Relemb.

(Minutes.)

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Last Paper

8574

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

Next Paper

8431

SECRET
GENEVA.

E 8375 4th September, 1947.

Nohn asked me to help him to work out yesterday the approximate populations of the Arab and Jewish States under the federal scheme. All we had to go on was a rough sketch on a 1: 750,000 scribbling map which had been signed by Sir Abdur Rahman. boundary lines were three colours thick in blue, red and black pencils and at places stretched to a breadth equivalent to some five kilometres. They were drawn with a complete disregard to district and village boundaries and it was not even clear whether it was intended that the Jewish quarters of Jaffa should be in the Jewish or Arab State. Mohn therefore asked Simic and Sir Abdur Rahman to meet him (Entezam had already left for New York) and to give some explanation At this meeting Sir Abdur of their intentions. Rahman explained that they had had no intention of making anything but a rough sketch; he admitted, however, that it would be interesting to calculate approximate figures of population and that it was desirable that, where possible, the boundaries should follow existing administrative divisions; he thereupon wrote out a note which he handed to Simic authorizing him and Entezam while in New York to draw the boundaries in rather more detail, but without departing materially from the general alignments shown in the original sketch. I was then asked to draw on to a 1: 250,000 scale map showing village boundaries and land in Jewish possession the boundaries given on Sir Abdur Rahman's rough sketch as closely as it was possible to interpret them and also to make a rough calculation of the populations. This I undertook to do and to-day I have handed to Simic a copy of a map and a schedule of populations precisely similar to

Trafford Smith, Esq., Colonial Office, LONDON. S.W.1.

26.

those /

TO 371/61878

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pressed his gratitude and said that these documents would enable him to discuss with Entezam possible minor adjustments of alignment. It is obvious from the map that with only quite minor adjustments the balance of populations can be substantially affected to the improvement of the plan. For example if the boundary of the Jewish State area in the south were to be realigned at its northwest corner so as to exclude Yatta and Es Samu the number of Moslems in the Jewish State would be reduced by some 9,000 and the exclusion of the Jewish quarters of Jaffa from the Arab State would reduce the number of Jews in that State by some 30,000.

Apparently the federal group does not intend to publish any figures of population. They certainly did not calculate them before drawing their lines which in places must have been drawn with eyes shut.

Din.

P.S. Since writing the above, I have managed to obtain another copy of the Report, and enclose it herewith.

Dom.

P.P.S. Emclosed also are:

(a) The Zionist General Council's Resolution of 3rd September;

(c) Cutting from New York Herald Tribune of 3rd September.

**FO 371 61878



PARTITION OF THE PARTY OF THE P

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areb state

Settled population as at 31st December, 1946.

Blook	district		Moslens	1em	Christians	Others	20303	344
Western	Agre	Whole	51,130	3,030	11,800	7,640	73,6 00	
Galilee	Safad	26	22,130	2,400	1,510	860	26,900	
	Tiberias	6	3,900	230	900	1,300	6,410	
	B eis an	1	34 0	eido.	•	***	340	•
	Meseroth	19	26,270	90	10,790	**	37,15 0	
	ileife	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	10	2.890	760	7.90	er pa
<u>rosala</u>			108,050	5,760	27,890	10,640	152,340	Farsion Marie
Samaria & Judea	Jenin	Whole	60, 000	· ******	1,210	496	61,210	
	Neblus	Broot 3	94,180	***	1,560	230	95,970	
	Tulkarm	22	30,44 0	***************************************	H io	20	30,800	
	H eif a	2	2,540	-	•	***	2,540	
	Romelleh	Whole	40,520	***	8,410	*****	48,930	
	Jerusale m	whole	104,460	102,520	46,130	160	2 53, 2 7 0	
	Rebron	Section 1	81. 860	300	170_	10	85° Aro	∂-13 0 -pooje
<u>Totala</u>			414,000	102,820	57,820	420	575 , 060	(maghes na
l yc ca	Ramle	49	74,870	1,410	5 ,69 0	10	81,980	
& Gaze	Jaff a	2	53.950	33.260	16,800	30	104,020	
	Gasa	All except 2	142,370	3,940	1,290	400	247,200	
	Beershebs	hole	6.270	510	210	10	7,000	
	Total	<u> </u>	277,440	38,72 0	23 , 99 0	50	34.0, 2 00	معبيتين
			mole Av	ad State	à			
Western	Gal ile		108,050	5,760	27,890	10,640	152,340	
Semeria	å Jude a		414,000	102,820	57,820	420	5 75, 060	•
Lydda &	30.50		277.bls0	36,720	23,990		340,200	einelpite.
	Total	2	799,490	247,300	109.700	11,110	1,067,600	

N.B. The figure of 147,300 Jove includes 99,320 in the City of Jerusalem and 30,820 in the Jewish quarters of Jaffa, leaving a balance of 17,160.

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference: FO 371 61878

Jewish State

Settled population as at 31st December, 1946.


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	Tiberias	all except	6	20,040	13,410	1,570	40	35,060				
	Beisan	exect		16,320	7,590	680	20	24,610				
	Negareth	20		3,890	7,890	980	***	12,760				
Re1fa	Ha ife	ezoe) t	ь	89,150	119,010	30,820	3.99 0	242,970				
Sama ria	Neblus	3	4-4	1,710	***	1834s	. same	1,710				
	Tulkarm	68		43,120	16,180	h o	dipa	59,34 0				
Jerusalem	Hebron	4		10,780	ush r	- No.	•	10.780				
Lydda	Reale	42		21,720	30 ,18 0	15 0	**	52. 050				
	Jaffa	except	2	42,050	2 61, 900	990	33 0	30 5, 27 0				
Geze	Gaza	2		3,350	•••	10	**	3, 340				
	Totals		en paragalante	277,290	460,930	35,36 0	4,300	777,960				
Summary												
	Mos	slems	Je	∋w s	Christian	others		Total				
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Totals		1,076,780 60		8,230	145,060	15,490)	1,845,560				


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
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PALESTINE

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Registry \ 8431/957/31

FROM

7.0

1947

No. Menute.

Dated M'Henrikes

Received in Registry

8, Let

Views on U.N.SCOP., WITT. REID M.P.

M'heid rang, and said to considered the may onity report, unjest and unstate manhite and from an administrative went of view obsolutely factority. He scarcely likes the usenonity report any better.

Last Paper

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References

(Print)

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(Action completed)

Next Paper

8432

32538

Minutes. | E | 8431 | 139

Secretary of State.

Mr. T. Reid, M.P., rang me uppand asked me to tell you that he has now read the United Nations Committee's report on Palestine, but he considers the majority at the report unjust and unstatesmanlike and from an administrative point of view, absolutely fantastic. He scarcely likes the Minority Report any better.

He said that he wished you to know this but he did not wish to disturb you. He is, however, at your disposal if you wish to talk to him about it (TEL: Acorn 4320).

John Mary Bon Mary Bo

8th September, 1947

rence: FO 371/61878

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141

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 2523

D. 8.42 p. a. 11th September 1947.

11th September 1947. R. 2.10 a.m. 12th September 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalca

IMMED LATE

TTTTT

Your telegrams Nes. 2997 and 3003.

Palestine Committee Report.

E-8447

Secretariat will be able to supply printed copies of volume 1 of report (see paragraph 2 below) in bulk by 16th September and enquire whether this affects Stationery Office decision to print separately. They remind us that His Majesty's Stationery Office is normal channel for distribution of United Nations documents and they had hoped for a considerable sale in the United Kingdom whether copies can be despatched immediately on publication. Please let me know immediately if this affects your decision. If so Stationery Office should inform Secretariat before September 15th of their requirements. I am meanwhile taking no (repeat no) action on your second telegram under reference.

- 2. United Nations edition will appear in four volumes:
 - (1) the report;
 - (2) annexes appendices and maps;
 - (3) public hearings; and
 - (4) private hearings.

Publication of appendices is delayed ewing to last minute addends and maps are only new in the printers hands. Volumes 2 to 1 should however be ready by about 23rd September.

3. In any event appendices and maps will be sent to you as seen as they are available in a preliminary form.

Fereign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram Ne. 65.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for transmission to Jerus Mem].

[Convert to M.E. Sceretariat].

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61878

TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry (8447 951 3 No. E 7791/31

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

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UK De, New York.

No 3021

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Apris C.9 & Ano. Hayward Sham) C.O. esh cur OUT FILE

More Immediali

142

Jour tilegram no. 2523 [Polistim bommetter Report]

printing of the Stationery Office, and in any case some printial copies must be available here (for prinisters) not later than the 18th. Phine therefore approach the Scentarist as instructed in my telegram no.

2. Hot shell not paint Volumes

3 and 4 of the Drieber Nations edition
will not be printed in Gondon.

We do not know whether Stationing
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material promised in your paragraph 3, what will and the printed on New York and the formation of the societable in General of the societable in General or the s

3. What an the annuals, as distinct from the expendices, to he printed in volume 2?

H-13. 12/9

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THING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61878

1.44

No. E 7781/7781/31.

Cypher/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations).

No. 3021.

D. 8.0 p.m. 12th September 1947.

12th September 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem.


W:W:W:W

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No.2523 [Palestine Committee Report].

It is too late to stop printing by the Stationery Office, and in any case some printed copies must be available here (for Ministers) not later than the 16th. Please therefore approach the Secretariat as instructed in my telegram No. 3003.

- 2. Volumes 3 and 4 of the United Nations edition will not be printed in London. We do not know whether Stationery Office would wish, for the sake of completeness, to print Volume 2 even if little or no time was saved thereby. It would be helpful to know when we may expect the material promised in your paragraph 3.
- 3. What are the annexes, as distinct from the appendices, to be printed in Volume 2?



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OIP.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Busk. No. 813. D. 9.35 a.m. 12th September, 1947. R. 12.20 p.m. 12th September, 1947.

10th September, 1947.

Repeated to Damascus, Beirut,

Amman,
Jedda,
Cairo,
Jerusalen
New York

Jerusalem. New York (U.K. Delegation)

IMPORTANT.

SECRET.

My telegram No. 804.

Prime Minister informed me on September 9th that his [grp.undec.? reason for calling] a meeting of the Arab League to discuss Palestine had been that he felt it was of vital importance that the British and American Governments should be under no illusions as to what would happen is they support a policy in Palestine unacceptable to the Arabs. He said that he imagined that the Arab League would inform both Governments that if the Arab views were ignored there would be serious trouble, political and economic, between the Arab world and Great Britain and the United States.

No one would regret this more than the Prime Minister, but it was inevitable.

- 2. Prime Minister imagined that the [grp.undec.? meeting] would decide that in such an event secret decisions reached at Bludan (your despatch 550 1946) would be put into effect. He said personally he would try to prevent the League giving publicity to these decisions, since he did not wish to seem to be making threats, but he felt that the League would probably communicate decisions privately to the British and the United States Governments.
- 5. Prime Minister continued that he did not wish us to think that if the Arab world fell out with Great Britain, and the United States, Iraq (or he thought any other Arab State) would turn to Russia. He hoped that there would be no quarrel between the Arab world and the Western powers, but if any such quarrel did occur "it would be one between brothers a private quarrel in which interference by outsiders would not be permitted". He said that this was his personal view, but he could not conceal from me that if he were forced to resign others might take his place who would find it easy to agree that the friendship of the western powers had done nothing for the Arabs, and who

LA AL

would advocate co-operation with Russia.

- 4. Prime Minister continued that he had done his best to keep everything quiet here. I would have noticed the recent public demonstrations had all passed off without incident. He had instructed the police everywhere to ensure that no Jew was harmed. At his Press conference (see my telegram No. 807) he had done his very best to calm public opinion, though issuing a warning that the situation was very grave and that serious trouble might have to be faced.
- 5. All this again was his personal policy, and he must point out that there were many who did not agree with him, and who advocated more violent courses.
- Iraqi Jews who were a long established and useful community. He felt bound to tell me, however, that the Arab League meeting might decide that if a satisfactory solution of the Palestine case was not reached severe measures should be taken against all Jews in Arab countries. He would be unable to resist such a proposal.
- 7. As far as Iraq is concerned the Prime Minister seems to me to be handling the situation very sanely. His Press conference has been well received, though he actually and misely said very little. In general, press comment though very strong is not yet violent or hysterical. Telegrams of protest continue to pour in to the Embassy and the Ministry of the Interior.
- 8. Prime Minister spoke similarly to United States Ambassador.

Foreign Office please pass to Amman and U.K. Delegation New York as my telegrams 61 and 8 respectively. Beirut please pass to Damascus as my telegram 85.

[Repeated to Amman and U.K. Delegation New York]

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61878

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1 2 3 % 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61878

E 8470

[EN CLAIR]

DEPARTMENTAL No: 1

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No: 2534

D. 7.15.a.m.12th September 1947

12th September 1947

R. 12. 30. a.m. 13th September 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem

X:X:X:

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram 3021.

Palestine report.

Secretariat agree orally to publication by Stationery Office.

They state that formal permission is not required since United Nations have no copyright. For this reason they request omission (repeat omission) from formula in paragraph 2 of your telegram 3003 of words "with the approval of the Secretary General of the United National" Nations" .

2. Your paragraphs 2 and 3. "Annexes" are documents such as League Covenant and Balfour Declaration and "Appendices" are statements and reservations of individual delegates. Both these will be circulated in mimeograph form in the next few days and together with maps (which are not yet available here) will be published by Secretariat as Volume 2 of report about October Volumes 3 and 4 will probably be ready about the e. Latter will however not be released to the

169	B	E 8562
1947		11:D : 150
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10, DOWNING STREET, S.W.1

SECRETARY

ign Office 350

The attached communication addressed to the Prime Minister is transmitted to you to be dealt with in whatever manner is considered appropriate by the Department concerned. It refers to previous correspondence which was forwarded to you on

- 1. No acknowledgment has been sent from here.
- 2. A plain acknowledgment has been sent from here, adding that the communication has been forwarded to your Department.
- 3. A copy of the acknowledgment which has been sent from here is attached.

Date 12 September 1947

Reference: FO 371 6187

RECORD OFFICE,

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POST

TELEGRAM

Prefix. Time handed in. Office of Origin and Service Instructions. Words

TO ATTLEE PRIMENINISTER

DOWNINGSTREET LONDON =

ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY AR C R ATTLEE

PRIMEINISTER DOWNINGSTREET LONDON COLON HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR OF ADEN COLON HIS EXCELLENCY

ATDLER/HYAA AZZAMPASHA SECRETARY ARABLE/GUE CA RO

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
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· Prefix. Time handed in. Office of Origin and Service Instructions. Words.



STRONG PROTEST AGAINST REPORT OF UNO COMMISSION ON PALESTINE STOP ARABS OF INDONESIA CAN NEVER AGREE TO PROPOSE PARTITION OF THAT ARAB LAND AND SUBJECTION OF MOST 1/-PORTANT PARTS OF IT INHABITED BY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OUR PALESTINIAN ARAB PROTHERS TO RULE OF ALIEN ZIONIST COLONISERS STOP OUR FELLOW OUSLINS OF OTHER RACES WHO DWELL IN INDONESIA JOHN WITH US

SOPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONG

IN YOUR STRONG PROTEST STOP = SEYID SALEHBINMOHAMAD
ALATAS MEE CHAIRMAN SEYID MOHAMADEINHUSEIN ALKAFF

VICECHAIRMAN AHMAD PINAFIFF TREASURER ABDULLAH
HARHARAH SECRETARY ARAB WELFARE ASSOCIATION BATAVIA */

For free repetition of doubtful words telephone "TELEGRAMS ENQUIRY" or call with this form Bord at office of delivery. Other enquiries should be accompanied by this form, and, if possible, the envelope

E 8580 SEP 156

PALESTINE

U.S. Comment an UNSCOP Report.

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Last Paper

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(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

N.A. DAK Wally

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(Action completed)

Next Paper

8584

32538

Fee 856

13 (

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

11th September 1947

Ref: 15/286/47 RESTRICTED

Dear Department,

Comment in the United States press on the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine is directed almost entirely towards the majority finding; the minority finding is quite evidently regarded as a non-starter and is hardly discussed at all. Editorials have, on the whole, been favourable, though it is widely considered that the Committee could only make, and has made, the best of a bad job. As the Baltimore Sun puts it, it is not surprising that the Committee, faced with two irreconcilable views, has fallen back on Solomon's way of thinking. Many newspapers find it a virtue that the majority in the Committee favour a separate Jewish state. Indeed, Arthur Krock, in his column, singles out as the most impressive part of the report the fact that both the majority and minority groups in the Committee concede great merit to the case for a Jewish homeland.

2. The New York Herald Tribune probably sums up best the attitude of the more serious sections of opinion when it states in an editorial: "That it is a bad compromise goes without saying. The Arabs are bitter and the Zionists are doubtful. But there is reason to believe that it is the best compromise which the wit and the institutions of mankind are able to achieve". This newspaper goes on to urge obliquely, as do other newspapers more directly, the necessity of U.S. assistance in the implementation of a solution. It says, "This is no longer a problem of Arabs, Jews and British; it has become a United Nations problem and the strongest members of the United Nations will

/have

Eastern Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. TO 371/61878

THE PUBLIC

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have to face their share of the common responsibility".

- Two further points are generally stressed: first that the Committee recommended the termination of the British Mandate; secondly that there are great practical difficulties to be overcome, such as the definition of frontiers, the control of the Arabs and the Jewish extremists, together with the actual enforcement of a solution and the achievement of a workable economic relationship between the Jewish and Arab states with feeling running as high as it now does. It is evident that much anxiety is felt on this score.
- 4. Very few newspapers have commented about the inclusion of Jaffa by the majority in the Jewish area. P.M., violently pro-Jewish as it is, considers that a change might usefully be made here, since no Jew in Palestine wants Jaffa. This newspaper suggests that those who are concerned about the stability of the Middle East will probably think it wise to effect an exchange of Jaffa for Western Galilee. It is doubtful whether those who have mentioned this point have thought deeply enough about it to realise, as does the head of the Jewish Agency in Washington (who also has his doubts about Jaffa), that a town without any rural hinterland is liable to strangulation and that if Jaffa were to be given up, some territory adjacent to it would have to become Arab too.
- Little attention is paid to the fact that, although the Committee recommended the termination of the Mandate, the majority report does suggest that Britain (though perhaps with some assistance) should remain in charge of the arrangements to be made over the next two years. P.M. takes issue with this proposal and suggests that the minority conception should be adopted that an authority to be decided upon by the General Assembly should be appointed for the purpose. The Washington Daily News, in a more friendly vein, suggests that in fairness to Britain

she should not be left to carry the burden alone. Interest is more frequently expressed about the attitude which H.M.G. are likely to adopt towards the majority proposals if endorsed by the General Assembly, but there is little disposition to attempt an answer to this question. It is hoped that H.M.G. will be prepared to go along with the United Nations.

- One discordant voice may be mentioned, that of the columnist Edgar Ansell Mowrer, who considers the majority report a victory for the British and Arabs, since the Jews will only receive one-seventh of the territory promised originally by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George.
- Zionist comment is much on the lines of that 7. already reported from Jerusalem. It may be summed up as expressing rather cautiously the view that the majority report represents a workable basis for discussion (Rabbi Wise and the American Jewish Conference). The extremist fringe of course attack anything which will not give the whole of Palestine to the Jews. Brith Trumpeldor of America made use of its Annual Convention on September 3rd (at which Moshe Ahrens of Boston succeeded Aaron Propes as president) to assert this view. At the same time it attacked the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation for trying to divide the Jewish people into Hebrews and Jews. This bickering among the extremists naturally and fortunately weakens their influence somewhat.
- 8. We enclose herein editorials on the UNSCOP report from the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Baltimore Sun, Washington Post, Chicago Daily News, St. Louis Post Despatch, P.M. and The Daily Worker.
- 9. We are sending copies of this letter to the U.K. Delegation at New York and to Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

Reference: FO 371/61878

Sa.

THE PALESTINE REPORT

The United Nations Committee on Palestine has produced a 7-to-4 report, mae ublic yesterday in summary, which at least points a way toward a. solution of the Holy Land's tragic and heart-breaking problems. The plan includes partition, with an economic union between the Arab and Jewish States; it would place Jerusalem under a United Nations trusteeship; it would admit 150,000 Jewish immigrants within the next two years; it would leave Britain as a trustee Power until the new governments are set up, but under United Nations supervision and perhaps with one or more other members of the United Nations as collaborators; it would call for democratic rights and processes, for the protection of minorities, for the safeguarding of the holy places of three great religions, and for the preservation of existing languages and cultures.

Some of us have long had doubt as to the wisdom of erecting a political state on a basis of religious faith. The question, however, is now in the hands of the United Nations. Since we believe the prestige of that great enterprise to be of primary importance at this stage of the world's history we would stand ready to accept any favorable U. N. decision and to work and hope most earnestly for the success of the proposed new commonwealths. The remainder of the general principles laid down will appeal to all those who believe in democracy and brotherhood.

There will be especial interest in the proposed relaxation of the immigration restrictions. If these are lifted there should be no more pitiful shiploads of refugees, carried hopelessly from port to port, no more desolate exiles on Cyprus. And there should be an end to bloodshed in Palestine, to lawless killings, to cruel reprisals, to martial law, to the stirring up of hate between those whose common interest it is to work in peace in the same promised land.

Unhappily, two great questions must remain in doubt. No one can make up his mind in an hour or two as to the practicability and justice of the proposed partition lines. As in all such partitions, there will be minorities on each side of the line, and in all such cases it is difficult to secure absolute fair play for such minorities. If economic cooperation between the two proposed states could be complete the boundaries might come to mean little. But in Palestine's present mood they mean a great deal.

The second question is the acceptance of any such plan. India, Iran and Yugoslavia voted against partition, preferring a federal plan of their own. Arab opposition has already been expressed. The Zionists, who manifestly have more to gain, may be expected to be more amenable. But we are entering upon a great discussion, not completing one.

A great step forward has been made in lifting the problem of Palestine into the world-wide arena. The Assembly committee came as near representing world opinion, minus the special pressures of the great Powers, as any such group could. The Assembly, in which the report will be debated, cannot compel acceptance, but it can bring world opinion to bear in favor of a just, peaceable and early settlement.

RECORD

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The Palestine Report

The report of the United Nations Special Color tee on Palestine is an impressive the not so much for what it recommence as for the long history behind it, the weight of international authority which it carries, the force of world opinion on which it can call. There are limits to the capacities of human wisdom. The Palestine problem, involving a violent conflict of legal rights and passionately held convictions, defies any perfect or "just" solution. From the appointment of the committee it was inconceivable that this body would recommend either to restore Palestine to the Arabs, as the Arab states demand, or to award it to the Jews; dealing with an extremely involved complex of historical facts, it was obviously the commission's task to recommend a compromise, and this it has done. That it is a bad compromise goes without saying. The Arabs are bitter and the Zionists are doubtful. But there is much reason to believe that it is the best compromise which the wit and the institutions of mankind are able to achieve.

The Peel commission recommended partition, which seemed impracticable; the more recent Anglo-American commission recommended a unification which seemed impossible. The majority of the United Nations commission has recommended political partition together with economic unification. For this fiercely divided community, occupying an area no larger than the State of Vermont, the recommendation may seem fantastic. But it is less so than the minority plan, advanced by the representatives of India, Iran and Yugoslavia; it is the best that the combined statesmanship of the world, after excluding all the more interested parties, could do. And it has the great difference over all previous findings that it takes responsibility out of the hands of the British mandatory and vests it squarely upon all the nations.

The proposals will, of course, be fiercely debated before the General Assembly. The debate may prove to all the parties that this, or something very like this, is in fact the best that can practically be achieved by any appeal to "justice," by any form of international action, by any reliance on world opinion or on other processes than those of brute force. If so, and if the commission plan is accepted by the Assembly, there may be some hope of an assuagement of the passions involved and some chance that the plan will be loyally implemented by the Arab as well as the Jewish communities and will therefore prove workable.

If not, the responsibility will rest on all the powers and not simply on the British. As to what would happen should the Palestine Arabs refuse to set up their state or make the proposed economic treaty, the commission is vague; but it at least hints that the United Nations should erect the Jewish state anyway, while it rather more than hints that the United States should during the two-year interim period assist the British on the ground. We are reaching the point at which, if the best that reasonable men can offer is not accepted by those concerned, the world will either have to abandon the problem entirely or else executive force will have to be applied by those who possess it in order to compel a tolerable settlement. This is no longer a problem of Arabs, Jews and British; it has become a United Nations problem, and the strongest members of the United Nations will have to face their share of the common responsibility.

THE PUBLIC

RECORD

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Which Plan for Palestine?

By Milton Howard

Possibility of a solution in Palestine grew somewhat stronger this week as a United Nations Commission offered two plans, a majority and a minority, to tackle the problem.

Jewish opinion in this country, though aware of the long process of debate and negotiation still lying ahead, felt a certain optimism with the publication of the plans. It saw the proposed plans as the basis for negotiations, at least.

They will come up for debate Sept. 15 before the UN.

WE ARE GLAD that it is a UN commission through which this problem is being tackled, instead of through unilateral action by either London or Washington or through private agreements between them in exclusion of other powers as has been the case on other issues.

It is through the joint action of all powers, especially through Big Power agreement, that such world issues will be most satisfactorily decided.

THERE ARE TWO plans offered, a majority and a minority report.

There are very good features in both plans, and real weaknesses in both, also.

We judge them from the standpoint of our long-range solution, that is a free, independent, democratic, joint Jewish-Arab state, and also from the practical point of view as to how the democratic peoples can get the most out of the present plans for that fundamental solution for which we strive.

It is a fortunate omen that both majority and minority reports agree on certain basic matters for which we have long been striving.

These include: that the British mandate shall come to an end, that the country shall move toward independence under UN guidance.

It is a matter for gratification among the Jewish people, too, that both reports recognize their just aspiration for statehood.

But, after agreeing on these fundamental principles, the majority and minority differ.

THE MAIN ASPECTS of the

majority report are:

• Partition of Palestine into
Jewish and Arab states, but with
the provision that the economic
life of these two states shall be
governed by a single commission
having power over the customs,
rails, postal services, etc., of these
two states.

• Immediate immigration into Palestine of 150,000 Jews the first two years, or 60,000 annually if the period be longer than two years.

• Meanwhile, the British for the next two years will carry out this plan.

• The division gives the Jewish state such Arab-dominated cities at Jaffa.

leaves the issue highly undecided.

• The immigration question to be left open, as stated above.

IT IS IN THESE TWO PLANS that the progressive-minded Jew-ish people in our country have to pick their way.

The first plan is clearly the stronger on the vital immigration issue.

But the so-called economic unity aspect of it appears highly doubtful. How can two separate states operate a single economy? If they can agree on a unified economy, which after all includes nine-tenths of all the disputed issues, since immigration is also an economic question as well as a political-social one, then could they not also agree on everything else?

This leads one to suspect that the unified economy proposal in the partition plan is more a promise than a realizable reality under the terms of the majority report.

And this, of course, is a grave weakness of the plan, whereas the immigration and Jewish state parts of it will understandably make a much stronger appeal to the Jewish people.

THUS, THE MAJORITY PLAN is weak on the unity angle, while the minority plan is weak on the immigration angle, and while it appears stronger than the majority on the joint state issue, it is, in reality, defective because it guarantees an Arab majority on all crucial problems.

Our view, therefore, is that the Jewish people have to make every effort to amend and improve

whichever plan is up for a vote.

To the gains of the majority
plan, they should strive to add
the vital amendment which would
guarantee a genuine united Palestine economy and which would
pave the way for a political unity

to follow the economic.

To the joint Jewish-Arab proposition of the minority plan, the Jewish people ought to strive to add more definite guarantees for immigration and for a genuine, not a superficial, democratic unity of the Jewish and Arab peoples cooperating for the growth of their comon country, with equal democratic rights guaranteed for all.

THE WAY IN WHICH the majority plan for partition is presented, despite its valuable concession to the demand for immigration, offers many "danger" spots. The inclusion of Arabdominated cities like Jaffa in the Jewish state, plays into the hands of the pro-Nazi Mufti leadership, which could use it to foment revenge movements.

The fate of the country still remains in British imperialist hands for two years, leaving room for much intrigue and sabotage.

Jerusalem is omitted from the proposed Jewish state, leaving it in the hands of an international control, thus permitting alien imperialisms a seat right between the two new states, with great power for evil machinations.

RUTHLESS AND GREEDY imperialisms have too long played a

dirty game with the lives and fortunes of the Jewish people and of the other peoples in the Middle East.

They have thrived on division, and have been careful to perpetuate such division with the help of their agents in both camps.

It is this imperialist game which must come to an end in the Middle East. The Jewish people cannot place their trust on the British diplomats operating for the sake of their oil empire.

Nor can they have any illusions about certain American oil interests who see their chance to get a foothold in the Middle East using the Jewish and Arabian peoples at pawns.

THE JEWISH MORNING JOURNAL reports that Washington is consulting Wall Street oil corporations as to what stand to take on the proposed plans. Wall Street has no interest in the fate of the Jewish people or any other people; it is interested in its private profits solely.

It is to the interest of all decent people to fight for everything that helps to cut Palestine loose from the tricks and domination of the oil magnates, whether of London or Wall Street.

Let them fight for everything that brings closer the day when a mighty Jewish nation in Palestine will work hand in hand with the Arabian masses against outside intervention, against all racial hatreds, and for true democratic equality and unity.

RECORD

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These include: that the British mandate shall come to an end, that the country shall move toward independence under UN guidance.

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But, after agreeing on these fundamental principles, the majority and minority differ.

THE MAIN ASPECTS of the majority report are:

• Partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, but with the provision that the economic life of these two states shall be governed by a single commission having power over the customs, rails, postal services, etc., of these two states.


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THE MAIN ASPECTS of the minority report are:

• A joint Jewish-Arab state, but constituted in such a way as to give the Arabs the majority in the Supreme Court which will decide all disputed questions between the two houses, the lower to be elected by proportional representation, but the upper to be on a half-and-half basis. Only an Arab could be president in the proposed set-up. Also, immigration questions would be decided by a commission, three Jews, three Arabs and three UN, which



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Let them fight for everything that brings closer the day when a mighty Jewish nation in Palestine will work hand in hand with the Arabian masses against outside intervention, against all racial hatreds, and for true democratic equality and unity.

P.M. September 4, 1947

PM, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1947

OPINIO N

The UNSCOP Proposals on Palestine

cient statehood and sufficient territory to make a home for the homeless. As such it will be accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Jews.

It is true that the Balfour promise, as affirmed by the League of Nations, was for a Jewish National Home in all Palpartitioned once before; that the large, fertile and underpopulated Transjordan life and a deeply devoted and patriotic country was arbitrarily cut away from Palestine by the British in the early '20s.

But the Jews are in no position to reject half a loaf. The majority proposals would provide within a few years for the displaced Jews of Europe. Those who have seen the need in the DP camps and the heroic adventure of the illegal immigration will not cavil over details, providing only the Jews are given-as these majority proposals would give them-a liveable territory of their own.

lews Help to Raise Arab Living Standards

or deny their rights.

to Palestine by an old longing and new both in a Moslem world. necessities. The bulk of the land which would be given them is theirs already government. Under the trusteeship pro- as at Yalta, is prepared to go along with or empty desert on which only the stout-visions of the UN charter, it can ignore Britain and America in a compromise

The first essential of any Palestine | hearted would propose to make a home proposal from the Jewish point of view The cities and fields they have already is immigration. The majority report of won were largely swamp, sand and rock the United Nations Committee on Pal- before their coming. And their influx, estine grants that essential. It gives the as all admit, has raised Arab living stand-Jewish nation in the Holy Land suffi- ards in Palestine above all its Arab neighbors except the Lebanon.

UNSCOP Majority Proposes Accepting a Fact

On barren land wrested from malarial fen and forbidding desert a Jewish nation already exists in Palestine, a naestine; that Palestine has already been tion with all that any nation has: elected institutions, its own army, a rich cultural people. A Kurdish exile, paraphrasing the Koran, said to me in Transjordan last spring, "Those who are prepared to die, shall live." This applies to Jewish Palestine, as the Arabs well know.

The majority proposals only ask the Arabs to accept an inescapable fact, to fit it more closely into the framework of their own national life by agreeing or accept these recommendations as it solution of the Palestine problem which to close economic cooperation between their mutual advantage.

wants Arab Jaffa; it is an Arab port, an proposals into effect. Britain in the first What of the Arabs? They have a case. Arab cultural center, and belongs in the World War raised a volunteer Jewish For them the Jews represent a foreign Arab State. Those who are concerned Legion in this country which fought uninvasion and a social revolution, threat- with stability in the East and the se- der Allenby to reconquer the Holy Land; ening their way of life. I am too appre- curity of its minority peoples will see Britain or the UN can muster a volun- in the Holy Land for whom men are ciative of the friendliness shown the the wisdom of exchanging Jaffa for teer Jewish Legion again, if the purpose not without reverence once declared Jews by the Arabs in the everyday life Western Galilee. The latter would give is to enforce these proposals. of Palestine to disparage their position the Jews a common boundary with Christian Lebanon, and thus an addi-But the Jews have been drawn back tional element of strategic security for which would restore faith in its efficacy. shall have done unto me." This is the



A New Day?

pleases. If the British ignore them, there gives its Jews and Europe's homeless a Jewish Palestine and Arab Palestine—to will be trouble: the Jews will fight to chance to live. An agreement among the the last for the National Home. If the great Powers on Palestine could be a There are some changes which might British accept, they have a right to moral, first step toward solution of dangerous usefully be made. No Jew in Palestine financial and military aid in putting the rivalries in the Middle East which

The majority proposals give the UN occasion for a constructive achievement of the least of these my brethren, ye The Gromyko speech on Palestine at UN's opportunity.-I. F. Stone. The big question mark is the British Lake Success indicates that Stalin now,

threaten world peace.

Thus larger issues hang upon the outcome, and history may requite the UN's success or failure on a grand scale. One that when Judgment comes it shall be said, "Even as ye have done unto one

"Roosevelt Said" is on Back Page.

P.M. September 3, 1947

The World (Continued)

PM, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1947

By Victor H. Bernstein

Britain a Big Flaw in UNSCOP Plan

(Victor Bernstein, PM Staff Correspondent, | of any kind is unwise, unjust and | accompanied UNSCOP to Palestine, Geneva

There are two kinds of criticisms to be made of the partition plan advanced by the majority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).

One is the criticism that partition

unworkable. This is the criticism advanced by Arab leaders and a **small minority** of Jews.

That kind of criticism cannot be answered by any amendment of the UNSCOP majority plan. It can only be answered by complete abandonment.

On the other hand, those who see in partition a hopeful approach to the Palestine problem-they include this observer-see certain flaws in the UNSCOP plan.

Much Will Be

Made of the Flaws

Much will be made of these flaws when the plan is opened for debate by the General Assembly later this month. They will be spotlighted by both friends and enemies of partition. The difference will be that the friends of the plan will stress that the flaws are reme diable; its enemies, that they are

irremediable. In my judgment, and speaking as a friend of partition, these are the portions of the UNSCOP majority plan which need amend- minate the British mandate, the ity whatever. For Britain as the ment or clarification:

¶ Interim government.

envisages continuation of Great status. Britain as the administrative body in Palestine "under the auspices of importance. the United Nations" for an interim two-year period leading up to discussions which led to the formacomplete independence for the tion of UNSCOP, the British point Palestine states.

Britain is an unhappy one for two effecting any changes in policy rec

Report: Britain's Palestine Chief Protests Deportations

By Associated Press LONDON

Palestine's High Commissioner, Gen. Sir Alan Cunningham, has protested strongly against the government's decision to send the 4400 Jews of the Exodus 1947 back to Germany, authori-

Sir Alan, "vacationing" here, lodged his protest on humanitarian as well as purely political grounds, the sources said.

tative informants report.

GENEVA

The International Refugee Organization is reported prepared to return the 4400 Jewish refu- France overland from Germany.

gees who tried to enter Palestine aboard the Exodus 1947 to the camps from which they came.

W. H. Tuck, executive secretary of the IRO Preparatory Commission, said the organization was not concerned directly with the refugees, en route on British transports to Hamburg, but for humanitarian reasons those from camps would be screened and returned. He said the IRO would provide care and maintenance for the others.

(The British Government has said it plans to send the refugees -who sailed from France-back to

Palestine, Britain no longer enjoys of the present mandate, and recthe confidence of either the Jewish ommended merely that Britain caror Arab peoples.

United Nations ought not to saddle mandate power-or the trustee-al-Britain alone with the burden of ways has been and still is respon-The UNSCOP partition plan administering Palestine's changed sible to a higher international body

The second point is of immense today, the UN).

From the very beginnings of the ed out their unwillingness to as I think the choice of Great sume unilateral responsibility for ommended by UN.

1. Because of her past policy in Had UNSCOP decided in favor

ry out its terms, the British point 2. Once having decided to ter- of view would have had no valid-(formerly the League of Nations;

> But UNSCOP decided against continuation of the mandate. It decided that Britain should no onger enjoy the benefits-real or imagined—that her mandate position in Palestine gave her.

Should Not Have To Pay in Any Coin

It follows, therefore, that Britain should no longer be required to pay for what she no longer will have. And when I say "pay," I mean in any final partition scheme. payment in terms not alone of pounds sterling for the maintenance of an army in Palestine, but also in terms of the blood which may Jewish state. Yet one can underhave to be shed to enforce parti- stand why UNSCOP's majority in-

only-I think the minority report ward from Tel Aviv. is the wiser of the two.

But apart from the question of ing to accept a interim administration, there is tortuous map in

also the question of interim enforcement—the business of furnishing the men and guns necessary to assure the peaceful evolution of the partition plan.

Something to Watch Out For

The UNSCOP scheme does not mention this problem specifically. but the assumption is that the British army would undertake the task, possibly "with the assistance of one or more members of the United Nations."

Well, that's something to watch out for.

Will U. S. public opinion stand for the dispatch of U. S. troops to Palestine to aid the British? Would the U. S. State Dept., or War Dept., countenance the presence in Palestine of Soviet troops, should the USSR insist on keeping its hand in?

Here, indeed, is perhaps the most ticklish part of a ticklish operation. Yet I believe a way out can be found provided there's a sincere desire on the part of the big nations, most particularly the U.S. A. and the USSR, to find the

A Voluntary Foreign Legion

For instance, a sort of voluntary foreign legion, inducted into a rejuvenated Palestine police force and the whole serving under a UN military command and armed by the UN, could easily provide all the force necessary to keep Palestine reasonably peaceful.

In any case, both for her own sake and for the sake of the peoples of Palesitne, Great Britain's im-e mediate and total exit from the Holy Land should be provided for

¶ Boundaries. Jaffa, 90 per cent Arab, seems an unreasonable inclusion in the cluded it. A glance at the partition The alternative to Great Britain map indicates that to have given as the interim administrative body it to the Arabs would have made is the United Nations itself. This not only for a particularly tortuous is the suggestion advanced by the boundary, but would have cut off UNSCOP minority report favoring | Jewish Southern Palestine from the federalization and in this respect | Jewish coastal plain running north-

I think the Jews would be will-

Reference:

The World (Continued)

CONTINUED

exchange for a Jaffa headache. Perhaps a barter of Jaffa for Western Galilee could be arranged, as has been suggested by Mrs. Golda Meyerson, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency. Western Galilee, given to the Jews by the discarded Peel Plan of 1937, is turned over to the Arabs under the UNSCOP scheme.

Jerusalem Also A Boundary Problem

A third boundary problem is Jerusalem, which is made the core of a small international enclave by UNSCOP. The Jews are willing to accede to this with respect to the old city, site of most of Palestine's holy places, but want the predominantly Jewish new city as part of the Jewish state. The Assembly debate on this should be enlightening.

¶ Customs union.

ÜNSCOP's partition plan lays down as a prerequisite to independeence for the Jewish and Arab states the creation - signed and sealed-of a far-reaching economic union between them.

I think this is a constructive piece of statesmanship, for Palestine is too small to be divided economically and, in one field at least, Arab-Jewish co-operation should properly be encouraged to take root.

No One Can

Enforce Co-operation

Nevertheless the plan as presented needs some analysis.

Partition is in itself an enforceable act. A superior power can always enter the arena and say to the contestants: "This much is yours, and no more; the rest belongs to the other fellow.

But no one can enforce co-operation, which by its very nature is a voluntary deed. Suppose, in this instance, recalcitrant Arabs refuse absolutely to sign any agreement with the Jewish state. The UN-SCOP plan is fuzzy on this point. Here is what it says:

"On making the declaration and signing the treaty of economic union by either state, its independence as a sovereign state shall be recognized. If only one state fulfills these conditions, the General? Assembly of the United Nations

deem proper. Pending such action, the regime of economic union shall apply.

While UNSCOP was drawing up its report at Geneva, there were rumors that the delegates were planning to insert a clause specifically providing that so long as either state refused to sign the economic agreement, it would remain a mandated or trustee territory. Apparently, at the last moment, the delegates decided not to be specific and to pass the buck to the General Assembly.

It is a point which the Assembly must decide with utmost clarity. For in the long run, successful economic co-operation between the two states can alone make partition successful.

¶ International loan.

Nothing is said in the UNSCOP plan about an international loan.

Yet every economist and every engineer will agree that the full and satisfactory development of Palestine is possible only with the development of a Jordan Valley Authority.

Plans for the harnessing of Jor-

shall take such action as it may | dan water to irrigate the vast arid stretches of Palestine have been completed by American engineers.

All that is needed are the creation of the authority and the money to enable it to get to work.

International banking facilities have been created under UN auspices for just such projects. And outstanding in the Jordan Valley project is the fact that it would benefit not only Jews and Arabs alike in Palestine itself, but would accelerate the industrial and agricultural development of the whole Near East on non-political lines.

Financing of a Jordan Valley, Authority should be included in any final plan for Palestine voted; by the UN General Assembly.

Once Again, Partition

The United Nations special committee on Palestine r mends the partition of Palestine Setween the gray and the Jews In short, it reaches a nclusion already reached by a number of its predecessor committees and commissions, beginning with the Peel Commission in 1936.

The details of these various schemes of partition all differ somewhat. But they all grow out of a conviction that, considering the intransigence of both Arabs and Zionists, no other decision is possible. The Zionists have insisted steadily on a Jewish Palestine. The Arabs have insisted quite as steadily on an Arab Palestine. Confronted with these two irreconcilable points of view, is it any wonder that successive committees have fallen back on Solomon's way of thinking?

In discussing the partition of Palestine, it is best to look first at the drawbacks.

Partition breeds minorities and invites all the classic difficulties encountered when a self-conscious cultural group finds itself politically impotent. In the proposed partition plan, the Jewish state would have a huge Arab minority and the Arab state would have a small Jewish minority. We are being shown right now, in the partition of India, what happens in the way of violence and confusion when new political minorities are created.

Partition always raises charges of favoritism against the partitioning body. Which group loses, and which gains, by any given scheme of partition? Ordinarily, both groups claim to be the losers.

As a matter of fact, regardless of the exact location of boundaries, both groups are likely to be the losers. A scheme of partition always cuts across established economic relationships. It places walls between areas which, in terms of the business of gaining a livelihood, can get along better without those walls.

Thus the partitioning of Palestine surely will raise a variety of new problems. Even assuming for the moment that partition is achieved, we cannot assume that the "Palestine problem" is solved. Partition only substitutes one Palestine problem for another, in the hope that the new difficulties will be less severe than the old.

The United Nations committee has given much thought to mitigating the evil effects of partition. That area around Jerusalem, with its special religious significance for three groups (Arabs, Christians and Jews), is excluded from the partition scheme and would be administered permanently by the United Nations.

As to the economic effects of partition, the committee recommends that these be mitigated by the establishment of a customs union between Arab Palestine and Jewish Palestine, adoption of a common currency and joint control of public utilities.

A common currency and the absence of tariffs would be powerful incentives to close and effective economic relationships. As for the utilities, such as transport, communication, irrigation and the generation of power, these are not inherently respecters of political boundaries. Joint management would make it possible, for example, to go ahead with the famous Lowdermilk plan for irrigation and power development in the Jordan Valley—a project which would greatly increase both the agricultural and the industrial possibilities of Palestine and would serve as a kind of demonstration area for the whole of the backward Middle East in the value of modern management of natural

The committee recommends that partition take place as soon as possible, and that there be a transition period of two years, the two Palestine states becoming wholly independent on September 1, 1949. During the transition period the Jewish state would be empowered to admit 150,000 Jewish immigrants, and restrictions on the purchase of land by Jews would be annulled. Great Britain would be invited to continue her mandate, possibly in co-operation with other powers, during the transition. But the committee recommends the termination of the British mandate as quickly as possible—a recommendation which will be warmly approved by Jews and British alike.

It must be remembered that this new scheme is only the work of a special committee of the United Nations. But that committee has more weight than any other which has so far considered the problem of Palestine. The debate begins before the General Assembly in two weeks. Already the Arab states have signified their opposition. And the General Assembly in any case has power only to recommend—not to enforce. We are still a long way from the solution of Palestine's present difficulties. But once again we find a group of qualified investi-

gators driven to the conclusion that partition, with all its drawbacks, offers the only hope of peace in Palestine.

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Reference: FO 371 61878

The report the United Nations Special Committee and Palestine can be better evaluated in terms of expediency than of justice. For the primary question to be asked of the solution it recommends is not whether it is fair to all the conflicting interests concerned—that seems to be quite impossible-but whether it is workable. The question, in other words, is whether the report affords a genuine solution; whether it will bring an end to the problem. From the point of view of the rest of the world, a solution of this problem is imperative. Already it has embroiled so many groups and nations beyond those immediately involved in it as to constitute a real peril to peace. The existing state of affairs simply cannot be permitted to continue. What is necessary now is to accept the verdict and make it ef-

The Arabs, who have already protested against the U. N. report, have a legitimate case against it. So have the Jews, who have thus far lodged no formal protest but have certainly been awarded less than they deemed their due. The decision cannot be considered wholly fair to either side. Jews and Arabs alike can bring to the support of their respective contentions all sorts of data and documents; even Britain, the responsible ruling power, which has played the Jews and Arabs against one another, can make a case for itself, we suppose, out of the pressures and exigencies of world affairs. The U. N. committee no doubt listened patiently to all these cases, striving vainly to decide between them. But in sober truth they were beside the point. The point was that an intolerable situation had to be ended with as much fairness as possible and by the most expedient means.

This, it appears, is what the committee tried to do. Only time, of course, can test whether its solution will work well. But it seems to us to have the best chance of working of any proposal yet broached. Partition, to be sure, is no ideal solution in an area so small as Palestine. Yet it seems the only practicable solution in view of the bitterness that has been generated among its inhabitants. Its ill effects may be tempered by the economic integration recommended in the report. With good will and acceptance of the plan in good faith, Jews and Arabs in Palestine may well be able to develop the good neighborly relations which alone can bring peace and the blessings of prosperity to the long-troubled Holy Land.

No doubt there will be efforts, and especially by feudal leaders of the Arabs, to engender strife and to make the plan unworkable. It is indispensable to the success of the plan, if it is adopted by the United Nations, that such efforts be checked promptly and thoroughly; there is no room here for vacillation. The United States, we think, should share the responsibility and the burden of enforcing whatever solution the United Nations may decree. With this kind of firmness, the problem may be solved. And in this lies the best hope of Jews and Arabs and the world at large. Peace in Palestine is now the indispensable foundation for justice.

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Our Palestinian Policy

Pale e is expected to be a major test for the U Nations, in view of the special committee's recommendations. It will be. But the committee report also is a challenge for United States foreign policy, which is another of the uncertainties in the Middle East.

The Arab reaction, officially at least, is easily predictable. Led by the discredited, fascistic Grand Mufti, the Arab Higher Committee seeks an Arab state, and will fight acceptance of the narrow, winding region left them under the U.N.

committee's partition plan.

Jewish acceptance depends not so much upon partition as upon immigration. Orthodox Zionism's appeal for a Jewish state has been largely supplanted by the immediate need for rescuing the quarter-million Jews left in European assembly centers. To the Jews, this is a question of racial survival. The U.N. committee suggests immigration of 150,000 within two years. How the Jews react depends largely upon whether this proposal is made a strong guarantee.

Britain's position is even less predictable. Nat Barrows wrote in a dispatch to this newspaper that the British might eventually accept the U.N. committee's ideas. However much the British want to guard a foothold in the Middle East, Mr. Barrows said, they cannot afford to keep a large standing army there, and may very likely try to pass some of their tasks to the United States.

Not only will the United States position influence Britain, but we are the one power which has vital oil interests in the Middle East, coupled with a historical and humanitarian policy toward refugees, plus the resources necessary to guard. a decision in Palestine. U.N. will look to us.

So far the State Department has been highly reticent about our policy toward Palestine and the Middle East. The time has come for a clear statement of our Government's views, and for popular discussion. Just where do we stand?



No Easy Road

United Nations special committee on Palestine proposes separate Jewish and Arab states bound together for economic and diplomatic purposes.

On its face, it is a rational approach to one of the world's most explosive situations. But there is little that is rational behind the ideologies that make Palestine a powder keg. The forces are deep-seated, racial, religious and economic conflicts.

What the United Nations committee asks is that two groups with diametrically opposed ways of life, religious training and ideals, traditions, loyalties and desire for power, subordinate their differences and live in harmony.

First reactions from Zionist leaders were favorable on the whole. Arab leaders, on the other hand, are unanimous in their denunciation.

Certainly the Zionists fare better in the proposed program than the Arabs. There are approximately 500,000 Jews in Palestine; about 1,200,000 non-Jewish peoples—mostly Arabs. The proposed partition would give the Jews control over the best coastal area, the area around and north of the Sea of Galilee and the Negeb district. These areas include the most fertile regions of Palestine.

The proposed Jewish state would include about 500,000 Jews and some 416,-000 Arabs. The Arab state would include approximately 715,000 Arabs and less than 10,000 Jews.

There was no Arab or Moslem state among the seven that signed the majority report. But there are seven Arab states in the recently formed Arab League. They are joined to fight for the Arab's interests.

They are opposed to increasing Jewish immigration into Palestine. The U.N. proposal would increase the number of Jews admitted from 1,500 a month to 6,250.

If the United Nations rejects the committee report, the Palestine problem is right back where it was. If the United Nations adopts the report it must be prepared to enforce its provisions. It will have to support armed forces in Palestine to maintain order.

That, in all probability, will mean more bloodshed.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371 61878

171 E 8584 1947 PALESTINE U.S. Somment on UNSCOP. Report Refer W'You letter (E8580/957/81) D'hilves appealed & U.S. Gout Charreny Land and by oggreene Gadership to play mais part or implementing sommittees proposals sees wear of other Tewist lea No. Dated Received in Registry Last Paper (Minutes.) 8180 References (Print)(How disposed of) (Action completed) Next Paper E8622

E 8504

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

13th September 1947

Ref: 15/292/47

Dear Department,

Would you please refer to our letter 15/286/47 of September 11th concerning U.S. comment upon the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

- Rabbi Silver has just returned to the United States. On his arrival, according to the New York Times, he appealed to the U.S. Government to show its hand and by aggressive leadership to play the main part in implementing the Committee's proposals. If the U.S. Government were to favour the partition scheme, he said, and were to take their share in implementing it, it could go through. Despite Arab threats that war would result from the imposition of the recommendations, he thought that a firm indication by the United States and Britain that they would back the partition scheme would convince the Arabs that they must eventually adjust themselves to that solution. He added a warning that if the United Nations did not settle the Palestine question they would fail just as the League of Nations had done.
- Mrs. Moses P. Epstein, National President of Hadassah, who has also just returned to the United States, declared, according to the press, that if the U.S. Government failed strenuously to support the creation of a real Jewish state and also large scale Jewish immigration into Palestine, the U.S. would suffer the greatest blow it had ever known to its prestige as a champion of democracy.
- 4. Dr. Israel Goldstein, National Chairman of

/the

Eastern Department
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

* 5 6 Reference: **FO** 371/61878

the United Palestine Appeal, praised the majority report of the Committee which had, he said, lifted the spirit of Jews in Palestine and in Europe. He referred to what he called notice by Britain that she would not feel bound by any U.N. decision on Palestine, and predicted that she would be unable to disregard a final recommendation by that organization, unless she wished to deal a heavy blow to its effectiveness and prestige.

- Mr. Jacob Rosenheim, President of the Agudath Israel World Organization, announced that this body would co-operate with the majority report and was prepared to "reckon with the political facts", even though it rejected in principle any kind of partition. The anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism, on the other hand, has announced that it remains opposed to the creation of any sovereign state which is based on church-state ties or which undertakes to speak for a so-called world Jewish people. This body therefore expressed no opinion about the Committee's reports in their entirety, but it praised the "significant recognition by the Committee of the necessity for prompt action by the United Nations to extend worldwide immigration opportunities".
- Dr. Silver, Dr. Goldstein and Mrs. Epstein joined in a strong condemnation of Rabbi Baruch Korff's escapade in Paris, but Dr. Silver described the sending of the Jews from the PRESIDENT WARFIELD to Hamburg as"a most indecent climax to an indecent act".
- We are sending copies of this letter to the U.K. Delegation at New York and to Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

OFFICE, LONDON

1947

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E 8622

PALESTINE

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10. sept. 22

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(Action completed)

Next Paper

TELEPHONE: MAYFAIR 7755

Any reply to this letter snould be addressed to—

THE

G.39/2493

H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

LONDON, W

Sir,

With reference to Mr. Burrows's letter of the 11th September I have to acquaint you for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that 30 proof copies of the Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine will be submitted to your Department on the 16th September and the necessary priority will be accorded to the production of the Report for publication; the specified number of copies will be provided.

I have no objection to the proposal to publish the subsidiary documents in a separate volume when they become available.

> I am, Sir, Your obedient Servant,

Tontroller.

The Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, S.W.1.

(Action completed.)

Next Paper.

32003 F.O.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and Should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION
DISCRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE E 8631

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to United Nations)

No. 2558

D. 7.12 p.m. 17th September, 1947.

17th September, 1947.

R. 1.05 a.m. 18th September, 1947.

Repeated to: Washington - Saving

IMMEDIATE

MM

GIANT

Advisers are under constant pressure to disclose our attitude towards majority recommendations of Unscop and to declare how far we should go if above is accepted as it stands.

- 2. Argument is being spread with great effect that strategie importance of Palestine to our oil interests in Middle Rast and to defence of Suez Canal is so great that Great Britain is bound to implement whatever United Nations decides, regardless of consequences to ourselves.
- 3. It is proposed in reply to point to my statement at Palestine Assembly; with inference that we should only feel bound, as loyal members of United Nations. to implement single-handed what we felt was a viable solution of this problem.
- 4. We should however be grateful for earliest report of Cabinet decision; and meanwhile, if possible, for an indication of your views on suggestion that we might further hint to enquirers that if United Nations recommend a solution involving further use of force for prevention of fratricidal strift or imposition of a one-sided decision, it is up to proponents to find the necessary forces for this purpose.
- 5. Unless we can take a stand in thus restraining Latin-Americans, who hold the decisive votes, they will almost certainly accept irresponsible proposals of Jewish or Arab propagandists, under the impression that neither they nor the United Nations will suffer the consequences.
- 6. All indications point to their consulting and taking up positions this week; after which they will be difficult to move.



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Copies to:

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

E 8631/951/31. Cypher/OTP Secret.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations).

Ho. 3079.

D. 2 a.m. 19th September 1947 18th September 1947.

0:0:0:0

TIMEDIATE. SECRET. GIANT.

Your telegram No. 2558 [of the 17th September: Palestine].

The Cabinet will discuss Falestine on Saturday morning.

2. Their conclusions will be reported to you by Beeley, who leaves by air on Saturday evening. Meanwhile I am afraid I cannot endorse even the suggestion made in your paragraph 4.

61878

RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

E 8638

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 2561

D. 9.31 p.m. 17th September, 1947

17th September, 1947

R. 8.50 a.m. 18th September, 1947

Repeated Saving to Washington

My telegram No. 2559.

Palestine.

Mr. Marshall noted with approval that the Special Committee had reached unanimity on eleven points and defined the United States attitude as follows:-

"We realise that whatever the solution recommended by the General Assembly It cannot be ideally satisfactory to either of the two great peoples primarily concerned. While the final decision of this Assembly must properly await the detailed consideration of the report the Government of the United States gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with the unanimous approval of the Special Committee but also to those which have been approved by the majority of that Committee".



LON DON

RECORD OFFICE,

32003 F.O.P.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations).

No. 2573.

D. 2.54 p.m. 18th September 1947.

18th September 1947. R. 8.20 p.m. 18th September 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem.

GIANT.

0:0:0:0

My telegram 2534 paragraph 2.

Palestine report.

Annexes and appendices have now been issued as A/364/ADD.1 sent to you by bag on September 17th.

2. You will see that annexes comprise in addition to fundamental documents communications to and from Committee and resolutions and reports
on special matters such as acts of violence and displaced persons centres. Appendix consists of statements and reservations by representatives of Australia, Guatemala, India, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

Foreign Office please repeat to Jerusalem as my telegram 68.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Reference: FO 371 61878

32538

TOP SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S

E Enter

PERSONAL MINUTE 10, Motioning Street,

delhiteha

(The Best SERIAL No. M340/47)
FOREIGN SECRETARY

E 18725

Your draft memorandum on Palestine.

Paragraph 18, last sentence: I should prefer to say: "If the Assembly should fail to come to any conclusion, or if it were to propose a settlement for which His Majesty's Government could not accept responsibility, the only remaining course would be for us to notify the United Nations Organisation that we cannot continue to be the mandatory power, and that it is for U.N.O. to decide in what way and by what other power or powers its proposals are to be implemented. We should also state that we will withdraw our administrative officers and troops from Palestine by a definite date which should not be longer than six months, even if no other mandatory has been appointed and no agreement has been come to between the Arabs

and ...

and the Jews."

Reference proposed statement by United Kingdom Delegate. This appears to me to contain an inconsistency. On the one hand we say that we do not wish to influence the Assembly in the direction of any particular solution; on the other hand we tell them plainly that we could not agree, even in association with others, to participate in the enforcement of the Majority proposal. This is tantamount to condemning it as either inherently unjust, or as involving more force than we are prepared to use to give effect to it. Further, it will appear to the outside world that as we do not comment on the Minority proposals we do in fact favour them. I should, therefore, prefer to omit everything between paragraph 2 on page 3, and the final paragraph on page 4, which latter should, I suggest, be amended on the lines of my proposed amendment to your paper.

C.R.a

17 September, 1947.

3 4 5 6 Reference: FO 371/61878

OUTFILE

POREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

2nd September, 1947.

E8725 951 31

Dear Addis,

34 SEP 19477

I attach two copies of and paper which has been prepared here, summarising the recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

I understand that the Prime Minister wishes to see a copy.

Yours sincerely,

(SGP.) R. D. C. MCALPINE

J. Addis, Esq., 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1.

15

THE GARAGE

Report of the United Retions Special Committee.

on Pelestine has alread, been circulated to the Cabinet. The Committee's recommendations falls into three parts. There are twelve recommendations of principle, eleven of which were signed unanimously by cleven members and the twelfth by nine of them. These are followed by a plan for the partition of Palestine signed by even members of the Committee. Three members put forward an alternative proposal for the establishment of a Federal State. The eleventh member, the Australian, has not associated himself with either of these plans.

The General Reconsendations.

- recommendations are the first and escend, to the effect that the Mandate for Palestine should be terminated and independence granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date.
- The eight general principle is also noteworthy. This recommends that the General Assembly should immediately initiate an international arrangement chereby the problem of the distressed European Jews would be dealt with as a matter of urgancy "for the alleviation of their plight and of the "calculation problem". With this is connected the twelfth general recommendation, signed by nine members, stating that "any solution for Falcatine cannot be considered as a solution "of the Jewish problem in general".

The Rejority Plan - Partition.

4. Seven members have signed a recommendation for partition on lines shown in a map circulated with the Report.

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Salient features of this plan are:

- (1) His Majesty's Covernment would be responsible for carrying it out. (There is provision for the sesistance of His Majesty's Government by one or more members of the United Mations, but the members in question are not specified). The period of transition for which His Majesty's Government would be responsible is two years, though it is clearly implied that an extension might be necessary.
- (11) During this period of transition, 150,000 Jewish immigrants would be admitted. Should the period be prolonged, Jewish immigration would be allowed at the rate of 60,000 a year.
- are more favourable to the Jews and more unfavourable to the Arabs than those drawn in any partition plan which has at any time been contemplated by His Majesty's Covernment. The present population in the area allocated to the Jewish State consists of approximately 500,000 Jews and 500,000 non-Jews, mainly Arab. (The latter figure includes Seduin).
 - recognised by the United Mations until they had concluded a treaty of economic union. It is, however, provided that, if only one State fulfile the various conditions of independence, including read ness to sign the economic treaty, "the General Associbly of "the United Mations shall take such action as it may "deem appropriate".
 - (v) The City of Jerusalem, with a small area around it, is to be placed under the direct administration of the United Nations. It would be included in the occasion union of Felicatine.

LON DON

The/

The Manage of Plan - Pedales Like

S. A minority of three members severate a Federal State, with proposed rank power in the hands of the Federal Government.

The boundaries of the Arab and Jewish States (which would in fact be little more than provinces) are shown on a map already circulated. The following are callent features of this plans

- (1) There would be a three year period of transition, in which the country would be administered by "an authority to be decided "by the General Assessbly".
- (11) During the period of transition, immigration would be permitted into the Jewish area at a rate not exceeding its absorptive capacity.

 This rate would be determined not by the administering authority but by a commission composed of three Arab and three Jewish representatives together with three naminees of the United Nations.
- (111) The single constituent Assembly which is envised to make this plan would have to work within the limits laid down in a serios of general provisions, of which the most important are the following:
 - (a) Immigration would be controlled by the central Government.
 - (b) The right of residence would be seconded by the local Governments.
 - (c) The central institutions would include a bicemeral legislature. One of the two chambers would be elected in such a way as to give proportional representation to the population as a whole; in the other there would be parity of numbers between the

Jouinty

Jowish and Arab representatives. Legislation would require the approval of a majority in both chambers.

- legiclative system, the leave would be submitted to an arbitral body of five members, "including notless than two Arabs and two Jews". Although the allegiance of the fifth member, who would in fact be the final legislative authority in many matters of major importance, is not emplicitly stated, it is clear from the provisions made for his election that he would almost certainly be an Arab. Thus deadlocks resulting from conflict along examinal lines (e.g. over imagration) would be resolved in favour of the Arabs.
- (1v) The Head of State, who would be elected by a majority vote of both legislative chambers, would have a deputy who must be a member of the community other than his own an Arab if he were a jow and a jow if he were an Arab.
 - (v) Jerusalem would be the Capital of the Federal State.

 There would, however, be a permanent international commission for the supervision and protection of the Holy places.

Posttien of the Boinets a layerment in

- onsidered by the Constel Associal, when a two-thirds majority will be required for the adoption of a reconstruction.
- 7. His Majesty's Government are not at present committed to accepting, still less to carrying out with their our resources, such recommendations as the Associaty may make.

THE PUBLIC RECORD

OFFICE,

LON DON

At the special session of the Assembly last spring, Sir Alexander Cadogan drew a distinction between accepting a recommendation, in the sense of not impeding its execution by others, and actively carrying it out by means of a British administration and British forces. At the same time he reserved our right to decline the task of implementing proposals which would demand the use of force and which could not be reconciled with our conscience. While making an explicit reservation on this point only, Sir Alexander did not commit us even to passive acceptance of the Assembly's recommendations. Hevertholess we should presumably not wish to obstruct an Assembly recommendation by refusing to accept it. The crucial question will be its emborcement, and it is with this that the following paragraphs are concerned.

Inforcement of the majority plan.

- the Arabs that it is difficult to see how, in Sir Alexander Gadogan's words "we could reconcile it with our conscience". There are also strong reasons of expediency for declining the responsibility for giving effect to this proposal. The attempt to do so would precipitate an Arab rising in Palestine which would have the moral approval of the entire Moslem world and be would/more or less actively supported by the neighbouring Arab states. The Chiefs of Staff state that, in this situation, reinforcements amounting to not less than one division would have to be sent to the Middle East.
- yould be more serious than the immediate military problem. We should be engaged in suppressing Arab resistance in Palestine, and thus antagonising the independent Arab States, at a time when our whole political and strategic system in the Middle East must be founded on co-operation with those States. The treaty rights which would probably be accorded to us by the Jewish State/

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state would be poor compensation for the loss of Arab goodwill and with it of our prospect of establishing that firm strategic hold on the Middle East which is an indispensible part of Commonwealth defense policy.

In answer to these considerations it might at 10. first sight be argued that, once the operation of partition was completed, we could rely on time to heal the would, so that after an interval Anglo-Arab relations would no longer This, however, would be an unduly optimistic be affected. It would probably not be long before the Jewish forecast. Government, faced as it would be in the course of time with a problem of over-population and driven by the ultra-nationalist political parties which will not accept partition as a final settlement, would try to expand its frontiers. If Jewish irredentism is likely to develop after an interval, Arab irredentism is certain from the outset. Partition would establish a miniature State, under a Jewish Government but with a relatively very large Arab minority, entirely surrounded by Arab territory. It seems reasonable to suppose that the Arab population of this State would play a part in history not unlike that of the Sudeten German minority in pre-war Czechoslovakia. Thus the existence of a Jewish State might prove to be a constant factor of unrest in the Middle East, and this could hardly fail to have a damaging effect on Anglo-Arab relations.

that other Governments might be associated with His Majesty's Government in carrying out partition. Even if this were possible, which seems doubtful, it would not greatly affect the issue. On a short view, Arab sympathies would be no less alienated from Great Britain. And on a long view, British interests more than any others would suffer from the new element of discord introduced into Middle Eastern politics.

Enforcement/

Enforcement of an alternative plan of partition.

particular application of it, and adjustments could be made in the map proposed by the majority of the Committee which would, principally by reducing the size of the Arab minority in the Jorish State, eliminate much of the injustice of the present plan. But these adjust ants would have to be very substantial indeed before they has any appreciable affect on the Arab reaction to partition. And long before that point was peached they would provide a section refusal to accept it. Now that the apposite of their followers has been another by the readority plan, the Monital Londons commot accept auch less.

a form intrinsically more just that that now proposed, the probable result scale be that any over attempting to give effect to it would be faced simultaneously with an test rising and large-scale deviah terrorism. This would exceed the most difficult of all possible situations in the short run. Nor would the revision of the countaries of the Jewish State greatly affect the long-term consequences of its establishment. A Jewish Coverment would not be able to regulate immigration in accordance with a remission of small territory's economic absorptive capacity. The feet occupied a smaller area and would be felt more strengt, if the Jews were dissatisfied with the frontiers.

anforections of the minority plan.

Tor a federal State, primarily on the ground that it does not altogether close the door to eventual partition, the Arabs might be persuaded to acquiesce in this solution. To the Jews on the other hand it is totally unacceptable. An attempt to give effect to It would therefore be followed by an intensification

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of Jewish terrorism. On these assumptions the Chiefs of Staff consider that no reinforcements would be needed; in view, however, of the planned run-down of our forces in the Middle East, a point would shortly be reached at which the necessary strength could be maintained only at the expense of some other commitment.

- the minority plan is that, since it involves the willing co-operation of the two peoples, it is not capable of being enforced. Heny details in this plan are borrowed from the two sets of proposals which his Majesty's Government successively laid before the Palestine Conference in London test winter. But it was assumed at that time that the proposals would not be practicable unless they received some measure of consent from both Arabs and Jews.
- Assembly were to adopt the minority plan, any power accepting the responsibility for giving effect to it would not obtain a sufficient messure of co-operation and would thus be unable to extricate itself from Palestine after the three year period of transition.

Withdrawal from Palestine.

- grave disadvantages would follow from a decision by His
 Majesty's covernment to undertake the task of carrying out
 any of the three solutions which the Assembly may be expected to consider. If these disadvantages are held to
 preclude acceptance of responsibility for any of the three
 solutions, His Majesty's Government must be prepared for
 an alternative course of action. This would be equally
 necessary in the semewhat similar situation which would be
 created by a failure of the Assembly to carry any resolution
 whatever by the necessary two-thirds majority.
 - 18. The present situation in Palestine is intolerable and/

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and cannot be allowed to continue. His Majesty's Government have themselves failed to devise any settlement which would enable them to transfer their authority to a Government representing the inhabitants of the country. If the Assembly should fail, or it it were to propose a settlement for which his Majesty's Government could not accept responsibility, the only remaining course would be to withdraw from Palestine, in the last resort unconditionally.

- specified time, coupled with an offer to assist in giving effect to any agreement reached between the Arabs and the Jews before our departure, might then have the result of inducing them to co-operate in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable civil war. But a withdrawal, if decided upon, should not be made conditional on such an agreement.
- Withdrawal in the absence of Arab-Jewish agree-20. ment has disadvantages which should not be underestimated. There would be an interval between the announcement of our intention to withdraw and the actual withdrawal, an interval in which the task of the Administration might be more difficult In the absence of a Government than in any previous period. to which power could be transferred, the consequences of our evacuation would be unpredictable. Some or all of the Arab States would probably become involved in the resulting disorders; they might even quarrol among themselves over the country's In any event it is likely that the situation would future. before long be brought to the attention of the Security Council.
- even if it had to be effected at the cost of a period of bloodshed and chaos in the country, would have tow major advantages. British lives would not be lost, nor British resources expended, in suppressing one Palestinian community for the advantage of the other. And (at least as compared with enforcing/

RECORD OFFICE,

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enforcing the majority plan or a variant of it) we should not be pursuing a policy destructive of our own interests in the Middle Hast.

in the Middle East.

22. If white policy were adopted, we should no doubt be accused by both Jews and Arabs of having failed to fulfil our obligations to them, deriging from the Mandate or from general principles of political justice. The force of the accusation, however, would be greatly weakened by:

- (a) the record of our repeated efforts to arrive at a settlement;
- (b) our offer to stand aside and allow the United Nations to implement a policy;
- (c) our offer to abide by and facilitate any agreement arrived at by the Arabs and Jews themselves.

We cannot permit ourselves to be left in Palestine indefinitely, by the feer of this accusation. We have already stated, in the document which we presented to the London Conference last February, that "His Majesty's Government are not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Falestine themselves merely because Arabs and Jews cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them. It should also be remembered that each of the other tauguested policies would expose us to the same charge from either Jews or trebs.

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Great Smith Street,

S.W.1.

Foreign Secretary.

You suggested that it might be useful if I let you have, in advance of your discussions with creech Jones, a note of any preliminary views reached in the Colonial Office. I enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared in the Department accordingly, with which I personally concur, but I have of course had no opportunity to submit it to Creech Jones. attach a map illustrating the Majority recommendations.

1 am also sending copies to the Prime Minister, the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Defence.

1. 1.

16th September, 1947.

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

PALESTINE

one which His Majesty's Government could undertake to carry out. It is on the face of it inequitable and politically impracticable, the boundaries being so drawn as to include in the Jewish area (on the basis of present figures) almost as many Arabs as Jews and also the only two areas in which there is still scope for any considerable development (the Huleh and the northern part of the Beersheba sub-district). The Minority Hen depends for its practicability on the co-operation of both Arabs and Jews: of this there is at present not the slightest prospect.

The advice of the Chiefs of Staff supports the above view of the impossibility of accepting the Majority Plan as it stands. Its execution would entail appreciable reinforcements of the existing Middle East Garrison; while, as regards the longer view, the Chiefs of Staff have recorded the opinion that, even if we concluded some treaty with the Jewish State giving us military rights "it would be at the immediate and lasting expense of our overriding military requirements of retaining Arab goodwill and would thereby render impossible of achievement the firm strategic hold in the Middle East, which is an indispensable and vitally important part of Imperial defence policy". The Chiefs of Staff advice regarding the Minority Plan is not so They see at present no likelihood of that degree of clear. co-operation of Arabs end Jews essential for its execution, but seem to be ready to contemplate our remaining in the country for an indefinite "transitional" period, during which British strategic requirements would be secured, aubject/

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forces. Provided there is no appreciable Arab
resistance, reinforcements would not be required; but
our forces are planned to run down in the near future
to a point where they will be insufficient to deal even
with Jewish opposition, which is likely to continue
indefinitely: the Chiefs of Staff state that these forces
could be maintained only at the expense of some other
commitment. While they do not say so in so many words,
it is evident that the Chiefs of Staff would prefer to remain
in Palestine throughout such an indefinite "transitional"
period rather than accept the alternative of withdrawal.

Such an indefinite prolongation of the British 3. military commitment in Palestine is, however, scarcely acceptable in the present climate of opinion in this country. There is a strong political demand, reflected in much press comment, that His Majosty's Government should surrender the Mandate and so bring to an end this unprofitable drain upon United Kingdom finances (to the tune of some £40,000,000 a year) and manpower (the equivalent of some two and a half divisions being tied up in Palestine). Besides, the continued maintenance of civil administration with any degree of effectiveness would be impossible. Jewish disappointment would no doubt be expressed by non-payment of taxes, a device which has been threatened but never actually adopted in the past, and this action on the part of the Jewish community will inevitably be followed by the Araba, who would not wish to be the sole contributors towards Government revenue. immigration would be intensified and public opinion in the Jewish community in Palestine would swing over to open support of the terrorists. It is also doubtful whether the prospect of more years of frustration could be forced on the British staff in the civil administration. A number of resignations might/

OFFICE,

might be expected.

Yet a decision to wash our hands of the whole problem and to withdraw immediately without further ado is open to grave objections. The Chiefs of Staff point out that the military difficulties involved would be considerable; that it might be taken as a further sign of weakness and lack of determination to maintain our position in the Middle East and that it might well convince the successor states and the Arab world as a whole that treatics with us (the only way to secure our long term strategie requirements) would be of little practical value. difficult to believe that any other power (with the possible exception of the U.S.S.R.) would be prepared to take over the responsibility from Great Britain. It is concelvable that some machinery of international administration could be devised by the United Nations, but this could hardly be brought into being without considerable delay: moreover in that event we could certainly no longer hope to secure our strategic requirements, summarised by the Chiefs of Staff as follows -

- (a) Retention of full military rights in Palestine for the purposes of organisation of defence.
- (b) The power to locate in Palestine such forces as our defence interests require. This will entail:
- (1) The use of Haifa and possibly Gaza as a supply port and for operating such naval vessels as may be necessary.
- (11) The location of army forces with their administrative organisation within the civil districts of Haifa, Lydda and Gaza, and the subdistricts of Tulkarm, Nazareth, and Beisan.

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- (111) The use of an airfield system in the general area of central Pelestine, together with the necessary radar, administrative and supply organisations and the right to station our forces in these bases.
- (c) The retention of complete freedom of movement in Palestine.
- Suitable conditions so as to ensure the free flow of oil to the Mediterranean terminals. If the British Administration withdraws before some new regime has been established our departure will be the signal for an outbreak of intercommunal disorders: involving heavy lass of life on both sides: armod intervention from the Arab States is possible, with unpredictable consequences. The resultant chaos would certainly be detrimental to British interests in the Middle East and would be an invitation to the U.S.S.R. to fish in thatroubled waters. Apart from the general discredit involved in such a hasty withdrawal, we must remember that His Majesty's Government are under an obligation to the Jews who have settled in Palestine on the strength of their "promises" and protection (which the Zionista recent misbehaviour does not altogether cancel) to ensure that reasonable safeguards for their position exist There is also an obligation before we abandon control. to the Araba, deriving from the history of the past quarter of a century, which surely precludes our abandoning the Mandate in conditions which might turn their country into Even if Transjordan could not invoke any a shambles. treaty obligation, she could argue that our withdrawal

Dypicult Do ser wheat they could do representative of the Mandatory power. If it should appear to the United Kingdom delegate advantageous to take such a line, he might indicate that our attitude towards any new plan resulting from the examination suggested above might be influenced by the extent to which assistance was likely to be forthcoming from others in carrying it out. The instructions to the United Kingdom delegate need not go further at the present stage.

Along these lines and along no other can we envisage a way out of the present impasse. It is reasonable to hope that, faced with the alternative of British withdrawal before a settlement, the Zionists will ultimately accept a form of partition so modified that it represents an equitable reconciliation of the conflicting British obligations and can be imposed without a local Arab reaction that would overpower the existing security forces or lead to active intervention by neighbouring Arab States. seeking to obtain U.N.O. approval of the necessary modifications of the Majority Plan we shall be in a strong position, since we shall be the only generally acceptable instrument to carry it out. The Jewish State may be expected to agree to grant us by treaty the military Our long-term strategic facilities we desire. requirement of Arab friendship will be secured by the removal of the major cause of disagreement between the Arab States and ourselves. Zionist propagands will no longer bedevil our relations with the United States. thankless task in Palestine will be ended, our military and financial commitments reduced. Above all, lives and treasure will not have been spent in vain and we shall have completed without dishonour a chapter (inspired by many lofty aims) that links our name for all time with the history of the Holy Land.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference: TO 371 61878

His Majesty's Government ought to await its verdict; and it is politic because we want the main responsibility for the solution finally adopted to . belong to the United Nations rather than to His Majesty's Government, their instrument. however, at once indicate our acceptance of the principles unanimously laid down by the Committee (though we should perhaps express some doubt about the practicability of enforcing the principle of "economic unity") and in particular we can express agreement with the first two, viz. "that the Mandate for Palestine shall be terminated at the earliest practicable date" and "that independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable It is for consideration whether the United Kingdom date". representative should not go further and indicate some date, by which at the latest His Majesty's Government will withdraw from responsibility for the Administration. TT this line is to be taken, the earlier that date the better. (This is, of course, quite a different proposition from the suggestion, discussed above, that His Majesty's Government should wash their hands of the whole problem immediately). The United Kingdom delegate should also lay particular emphasis on unanimous recommendation 6 (regarding the immediate initiation of an international arrangement to deal with the problem of the distressed European Jews.)

7. Even if, as suggested above, the United Kingdom delegate does not at the outset indicate the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the Majority Plan, he will be questioned on it at an early stage by other delegations. Indeed, since execution by the present Mandatory is a feature of the Plan, other delegations will doubtless regard it as only reasonable that, before deciding their attitude

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e. in the event of partition

towards it, they should know whether the Mandatory is prepared to accept this responsibility. At the Special Assembly it was made clear that His Majesty's Government could not undertake to carry out any recommendation which was beyond their own resources or which they could not reconcils with their conscience. It is for consideration whether, and if so, at what stage, the United Kingdom delegate should refer to these statements and, if so, whether he should say that the Majority Plan as it stands is beyond our resources and is one which cannot be reconciled This seems preferable to a suggestion with our conscience. discussed with the Foreign Office that the delegate should state that "His Majesty's Government would not be able to accept the task of carrying out any recommendation without the prospect of a reasonable measure of acquiescence" and that the Majority Plan does not fulfil this condition. Besides encouraging recalcitrance, such a statement of our condition for accepting any proposal would probably be interpreted as hypocritical or unrealistic. event, having indicated that the Majority Plan is unacceptable, the delegate will then be asked, particularly if he indictaos that the refusal to accept responsibility relates only to the Plan as it stands, what modifications His Majesty's Government would regard as essential in order to satisfy their condition. He could then indicate that our opposition does not relate to partition as such, but to the vital element of the boundaries: alteration of boundaries in a partition plan in effect makes it a new plan. He could say that His

Majesty's Government would be ready to consider a partition

be appointed to examine the implications of the boundary

suggested by the majority report, with the assistance of a

plan with adjusted boundaries and suggest that a sub-committee

representative/

THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

English.

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in the above circumstances adversely affected interests of hers which we had undertaken to protect. Moreover as recently as April, 1946, at the final session of the Lesgue of Mations, His Majesty's Government accepted a resolution taking note of "the expressed intentions of the Mambers of the Lesgue now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Mations and the respective Mandatory Powers."

If them, His Majesty's Government cannot simply walk out of Palestine without some further effort to ensure that adequate arrangements have been made for its future Government and if neither of the U.N.S.C.O.P. plans as they stand is Acceptable, is there any other course open to us? Majority Report is regarded by the Palestine Government as workable subject to some modifications of the boundaries. The latter were drawn by the Committee hurriedly and without full exemination of all the implications. A careful study shows that, if Jaffa is transferred to the Arab state (as many Jows are ready to concede) and various local adjustments are made, which are reasonable in themselves and do not affect the general character of the partition, the number of Arabs in the Jewish state could be reduced by 100,000 to 150,000 without materially reducing its Jewish population. This substantially alters the picture and, elthough the Araba will undoubtedly protest vigorously even against such a modified plem, the strongth of the opposition particularly /in Palestine itself would be greatly reduced, while the losses of territory from the Jewish State are not such as to remove the possibility of their accepting the plan if convinced

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
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that nothing better can be expected. The position would, of course, be further improved from the Arab point of view and indeed the plan would perhaps be more easily defensible on grounds of equity, if some further concession were made either as regards the Huleh or (probably more acceptably from the Jewish point of view) in the Beershebs sub-district (the whole of which, including the purely Arab town of Beersheba and some 90,000 Bedouin, who own and oultivate considerable areas of coreal land, is assigned by the Majority Plan to the Jews). The recommendations are also capable of improvement on many points of detail; but, by and large, a partition on the lines proposed, with boundaries so modified, is a solution as nearly equitable as can be obtained in a situation where there are such conflicting claims to be reconciled. Its execution at the beheat of the United Nations and with its authority at least offers the prospect that it may enable us to affect an orderly withdrawal without permanently estranging the Arab World, which (once the sward is made and affer due protest) may be only too thankful to see at last an and to this constant source of friction between His Majesty's Government and themselves.

at the United Nations Assembly. It will be desirable to avoid publicly attaching curselves to any particular solution until it has been adopted (or it is clear that it has a good prospect of adoption) by the accessary majority of the United Nations: that is logical because having admitted their failure to find a solution and having put the problem to the arbitrament of U.N.D.

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
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
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British Legation, Damascus.

No.107 26/111/47 9th September, 1947.

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Sir,

With reference to Jerusalem telegram No. 1660 of the 2nd September on the reactions of the public in Palestine to the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, I have the honour to enclose, as annexes I and II to this despatch respectively, a translation of a declaration made by the Syrian Prime Minister in his Press Conference of the 3rd September and a very brief summary of the attitude of the Damascus Press to the report.

These may, I think, be taken to represent fairly the trends of the reactions of the Syrian authorities and public which, though on the usual stereotyped lines utterly rejecting partition, have on the whole been usually lacking in vigour. There have been no demonstrations.

> I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

The Right Honourable Ernest Bevin, M.P., etc., etc., etc.,

Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.1.

61878

ANNEXE I.

Text of Declaration by the Syrian Prime Minister at his Press Conference on September 3rd.

Palestine.

This is one of the most serious Arab problems. We met the fact finding Committee but we set few hopes upon its work. For we are aware of all the facts of this case. We can now say that the Higher Arab Committee were right to boycott it. We did not do so solely because as members of the United Nations Organisation we were bound to contact a committee representing that Organisation.

However, our statements to the Committee were stamped with the greatest caution and we made it quite clear that we had no faith in their work and warned them of the consequences. The question of Palestine must be dealt with by every Arab. It is no longer the concern of the Arab Governments only. The Arab people must be prepared themselves to do their duty should partition really be imposed and a Jewish State installed in the sacred Arab land of Palestine.

The lack of stability in this part of the world is the result of Zionist greed in usurping the soil of Palestine.

The Political Committee of the Arab League will meet at Sofar on Tuesday* next to discuss this question and to envisage future events and developments. The Syrian Government are keeping in close touch with other Arab Governments on this matter.

* The meeting has been postponed from Tuesday the 9th September until Tuesday the 16th September.



Reaction to Report of the International F.F.C. on the Palestine Question.

At the beginning of last week papers published the text of recommendationsput up by the F.F.C. Commentaries over the Report started since then. ALEF BA pointed out that even Jews have expressed their surprise at the inclusion of Jaffa in the Jewish Zone. AYYAM points out the Mufti's call for Arab resistance to the Partition Plan. INSHA asserts that even if the U.N.O. approves of the plan it will come to no fruition since the Arabs will consent to no solution which fails to assure their full rights. AKHBAR calls the Arab world to battle for Palestine. The employment of force on the part of Arabs rather than negotiations is called for, the Prime Minister is quoted as affirming that the Arab States will not accept the F.F.C.'s proposals. BARADA slates the F.F.C. as being worse than its predecessors. MANAR urges preparation for battle and wants Arab governments to institute compulsory mobilization and get well equipped. INSHA asserts that the Arabs will fight in a manner which will astonish the world. QABAS infers that the report of the F.F.C. signifies the evacuation of Palestine by the Arabs and asserts that a Jewish state in Palestine can only be created over Arab graves. INSHA turns upon France as friend and supporter of Zionists because the Arabs are asking for the independence of North Africa.

Information Department, British Legation, Damascus.

8th September, 1947.

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The Church House,
Great Smith street,
S.W.1.

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With the compliments of the Private Secretary to
Mr. Ivor Thomas, Parliamentary
Under Secretary of State for the Colonies.

15th september, 1947.

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SS Knows King

: Japa. The 17/9 [= 1370]

The Church House, Great Smith Street, S.W.1.

17th September, 1947.

Dear Mr. Dixon,

You will by now have seen copy of the Most Immediate telegram No. 962 from Jamaica, in which the Secretary of State explains that he has been held up in Kingston because the aircraft from the south could not arrive owing to mechanical trouble, and that weather conditions grounded all aircraft going to the north. In that telegram he states that he hopes to leave Kingston this morning and arrive at about 1800 hours on Thursday, the 18th of September, in London.

This morning I got on to Mr. Watson of the British South American Airways in order to find out the present position. He said that for Mr. Creech Jones to have left Kingston, Jamaica this morning, the plane held up in the south by mechanical trouble at Barranquilla, Columbia, should have left there last night. In fact it has not yet done so, and there is now no hope of Mr. Creech Jones arriving in London tomorrow evening, Thursday, September the 18th. Mr. Watson further stated that even when the plane from the south was able to leave Barranquilla, with its engine trouble repaired, it was still liable to be held up in Jamaica owing to the bad weather conditions to the North, where there is at present one of the worst hurricanes they have known for some time blowing.

Mr. Watson has promised to let me know as soon as possible of any further developments or news which he may receive. When he does so I shall of course inform you at once.

Ι

INWARD TELEGRAM

216

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Cypher (0.T.P.)

FROM JAMAICA (Sir J. Huggins)

D. 17th September, 1947.

R. 17th " "

21.05 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE No. 965 Secret.

Following for Ivor Thomas from S. of S. Begins.

We deplore this paralysis but are powerless to alter it. Plane is still delayed owing to defects and hurricane but we hope to leave by this evening. Unlikely in any case that England can be reached until Friday morning but (group omitted ?everything) possible being done to expedite journey. Will keep you informed. Ends.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office

- Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

" - Sir O. Sargeant.

Cabinet Offices - Sir Norman Brook.
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.

Reference: FO 371/618

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Ι

P.J. Dixon, Esq., C.M.G.

RECORD OFFICE,

ECEIVED IN O.B.

I am sending a similar note to Mr. Helsby, the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

R. W. Newsam.

Private Secretary.

INWARD TELEGRAM

216

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Private Secretary to the Prime Minister.

TO 371/61878

RECORD

OFFICE,

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM JAMAICA (Sir J. Ruggins)

D. 17th September, 1947. 02.00 hrs. R. 18th

Most Immediate No. 968

Following for Ivor Thomas from the S. of S. Begins.

There seems no prospect of getting out of Jamaica in any direction in time for Friday's Cabinet owing to weather conditions, burricans, and Departure before Thursday condition of plans. night cannot possibly be secured even if then. Extremely disappointed that though we left the place of conference Monday lunch-time we are stranded at Kingston like this. It is extremely doubtful if London can be reached this week. In these circumstances I should like to know if alternative course should be considered and Cabinets instructions from Friday's meeting brought to me in New York by Martin, I going on direct to the Assembly as soon as practicable instead of my returning to London with the meeting of the Cabines over. familiarised myself with the Palestine report and events and the Colonial Office is aware of the broad view I take of the problem. In New York, I can keep in touch with London for what further instructions may be necessary. Will you kindly explain my plight with my deep regrets to the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. I will of course return to London if that is most desirable but impossible that anyone could foresee this maddening delay. An immediate reply would help. Ends.

Copies sent to:-Foreign Office

Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

Capinet Offices - Sir Norman Brook. Private Secretary to the Frime Minister.

Prime Minister.

Since the Foreign Secretary saw you on Friday evening, I have been in touch with my Secretary of State. He will be leaving Jamaica by B.S.A.A. aircraft tomorrow, and is due to arrive at the London Airport on Rednesday evening. He should therefore be available for talks on Thursday morning.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary.

(SGD.) LVOR THOMAS.

15th September, 1947.

Copy sent also to:-

Sir Norman Brook, Cabinet Office.

En Clair

FILES

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

INDEXED

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 2614.

D. 5. 6. p.m. 23rd September 1947.

23rd September 1947.

R. 11.20. p.m. 23rd September 1947.

Repeated Governor Janaica.

IMMEDIATE

Following for Edmonds Colonial Office.

Mr. Creech-Jones has arrived.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office.]